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PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY  AND NBER 
What  Are  the  Costs  of  Excessive 
Deficits? 
1. Introduction 
United States federal government budget deficits have been exceptionally 
large in the 1980's. Figure 1, for example, shows the change in the real stock 
of government debt since 1950;  the contrast between the periods before and 
after 1982 is obvious.1 Opinions  concerning the welfare consequences  of 
these  deficits differ wildly.  At one  extreme is the  supply-side  view  that 
"deficits  that  result  from  reducing  ...  marginal  tax rates"  are highly 
desirable because they "strengthen people's claims to the income produced 
by  their  work  effort and  their human,  financial,  and  physical  capital" 
(Roberts, 1984, p. 310). The other extreme is represented by the position 
that large deficits represent "a prescription for economic  stagnation with 
no  end  in  sight" that will  cause  the  economy  to  "remain locked  into  a 
depressed  and  unstable  condition"  (Blumenthal  et  al.,  1983).  Between 
these  two  extremes lie a variety of positions,  including the view  that the 
deficits  are  desirable  because  they  create  political  pressure  to  reduce 
government  spending  and  the view  of Robert Barro and others that the 
deficits are relatively unimportant.2 
None  of these  claims about the effects of deficits is based  on a formal 
analysis of deficits' welfare consequences; judgments  of deficits' desirabil- 
ity,  whether  by  economists  or by  others,  are  generally  either  entirely 
informal or based on a combination of formal analyses of deficits' positive 
1. Typical forecasts call for the rate of increase in real debt to diminish only gradually (see for 
example U.S. Congressional Budget Office, 1987). Not surprisingly, conventional equations 
for the change in government debt that are estimated over the pre-1982 period dramatically 
underpredict the recent increases (Poterba and Summers,  1987). 
2. For the  former position,  see  the  view  attributed to  David  Stockman by  Daniel  Patrick 
Moynihan  (New York  Times,  July 11, 1985, p. A14); for the latter, see Barro (1984). 64 *  ROMER 
effects (the extent of crowding out, for example) and informal assessments 
of  the  welfare  implications  of  those  effects.  Yet-as  the  divergence  of 
opinion  suggests-determining  the welfare effects of deficits is extremely 
difficult. And the task remains difficult even when  there is agreement on 
the channels through which deficits affect the economy; simply comparing 
steady states, for example, is often quite misleading. 
But assessing  quantitatively the various costs and benefits  of deficits is 
essential  in determining  appropriate policy. Deficits can potentially affect 
the economy  through many different channels,  and each effect is likely to 
have welfare implications. Thus, if we are to have any hope of obtaining a 
clear picture of what course fiscal policy should follow, we must have some 
understanding  of the direction and size of these welfare costs. 
This  paper  is  intended  to  be  a  preliminary  step  toward  obtaining 
quantitative estimates of the costs and benefits of deficits. Because there are 
simple  conditions  under  which  deficits are irrelevant (Barro, 1974), and 
because  there are many  possible  reasons  that debt irrelevance might  fail 
and  no  consensus  on  which  reasons  are most  likely to be  important in 
practice,  no  definitive  assessment  of  the  welfare  effects  of  deficits  is 
currently even  remotely  possible.  I consider,  therefore,  several possible 
sources of real effects of deficits. And since recent discussion of deficits has 
focused mainly on the possibility that large deficits might be undesirable, I 
Figure 1 CHANGE  IN REAL  FEDERAL  DEBT  OUTSTANDING,  1950-86  (% OF 
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concentrate on  possible  costs  rather than possible  benefits  of deficits.  In 
particular, I consider a series of models in which deficits matter and analyze 
in each the welfare costs of a period of temporarily high deficits. Since my 
goal is to obtain quantitative estimates-albeit  rough ones-of  the costs, I 
make considerable use of numerical solutions to the models.  Even so, the 
models  are necessarily highly stylized; the cost estimates are not intended 
to be precise, but rather to suggest  whether  (and under what conditions) 
the costs of policy mistakes are likely to be large or small. 
I  consider  three  distinct  channels  through  which  deficits  could  be 
undesirable.  These  channels  are analyzed  in Sections  2, 3 and 4.  In the 
concluding section I briefly discuss other possible channels through which 
deficits might produce large welfare costs. 
The first channel that I consider is probably the most traditional: a tax cut 
has real effects because part of the burden of repaying the government debt 
falls on individuals who  have not yet been born at the time the tax cut is 
made. In this case, deficits help current generations at the expense of future 
ones  both  through  their direct distributional effects and  through  raising 
consumption,  reducing capital formation, and thus increasing real interest 
rates and lowering wages. 
The  second  channel  that  I explore  may  correspond  most  closely  to 
popular perceptions of the costs of deficits. I assume that deficits have large 
contemporaneous  effects on consumption  because of liquidity constraints. 
(In contrast, if deficits have  real consequences  only because  of intergen- 
erational effects, then tax cuts have only small effects on consumption  for 
plausible parameter values.) Intergenerational considerations are assumed 
to be negligible.  The reductions in capital that result from the increase in 
consumption  are undesirable because, following P. Romer (1987), there are 
assumed to be positive exteralities  to capital in production. (In the absence 
of such an externality or some  other market failure, a tax cut, by relaxing 
liquidity  constraints,  increases  welfare.)  In  short,  large  deficits  cause  a 
"spending  binge" that leads to an "inadequate capital stock." 
The final channel is the most straightforward: temporarily low taxes in 
the present imply that taxes must be higher in the future and thus that the 
pattern of taxes is not smooth.  This in turn implies-assuming  that taxes 
are distortionary and that higher taxes cause greater distortions per unit of 
revenue  raised-unnecessarily  large distortions.  This  is  the  mechanism 
explored by Barro (1979).3 
3. Throughout  I neglect  any  possible  cyclical effects of deficits.  Given  the  periods  of time 
that  I  consider  (several  years  at  a  minimum),  a  full  employment  model  seems 
appropriate. Moreover,  monetary policy could be used  to offset any  short-run effects of 
deficits on output via aggregate demand. 66  ROMER 
The paper's most striking conclusion emerges from the model of Section 
2, in which  a policy of low  current taxes followed  by higher taxes in the 
future has distributional effects across generations.  I find that for reason- 
able parameter values the welfare costs of excessive deficits are likely to be 
large, and  moreover,  that this is the case even if the effects  of the policy on 
consumption,  capital  formation,  and the real interest  rate  are negligible.  In fact, I 
show  that the costs of deficits through their distributional effects are to a 
first approximation unaffected by the strength of the links between present 
and future consumers  (as long as the links are not perfect). As the links 
between  generations  increase,  the  size  of the redistribution caused  by  a 
given  policy falls, but the welfare cost per unit of redistribution rises; the 
two forces approximately balance. Thus, it is possible-indeed  plausible- 
for deficits to have large costs even  if their distributional effects and their 
effects on consumption  are small. 
It is essential to these results that the capital stock initially be too low. In 
the presence of overlapping generations, the equilibrium capital stock need 
not be optimal. More importantly, it is widely believed that the capital stock 
is in fact too low; for example, every Economic  Report  of the President  during 
the past decade has argued that the capital stock needs  to be increased. I 
show  that if the real interest rate is too high, redistributions from future to 
current  generations  have  first  order  welfare  costs  independently  of 
whether or not there are any effects on capital accumulation. It is the impact 
of the direct distributional effects of deficits on social welfare that leads to 
the result that deficits can be costly even if their effects on consumption  are 
trivial. The costs involved  can be quite large. If the gap between  the actual 
and  optimal  rates of return is roughly  four percentage  points  (a typical 
estimate; see Feldstein,  1977, for example), the cost of a temporary tax cut 
of 4 percent  of  GNP  for ten years followed  by a policy  of permanently 
rolling over the additional debt created by the tax cut is likely to be in the 
range of one to two trillion dollars-equivalent  to the loss of approximately 
half of a year's consumption,  or, to put it differently, equivalent to the loss 
of resources that are approximately equal in value to the total amount of the 
tax cut. 
The  model  of  Section  3,  in which  temporary deficits  decrease  capital 
formation because  of liquidity constraints and in which  capital formation 
has positive externalities, also implies that the costs of excessive deficits can 
be  very  large.  Again,  it  is  possible  to  construct  examples  using  not 
unreasonable parameter values in which the costs of temporary deficits of 
4 percent of GNP for ten years are over a trillion dollars. The implications 
of the model of Section 3 are less clear than those of Section 2, however,  for 
two  reasons.  First, here  the  size  of  the  costs  depends  critically on  the Excessive  Deficits  *  67 
magnitude  of  deficits' impact  on  consumption;  since  this  magnitude  is 
highly  uncertain,  the  costs  of  deficits  cannot  be  estimated  with  any 
confidence.  Second, in this model deficits have not only a cost (the negative 
externalities from reduced investment),  but also a benefit (the relaxation of 
liquidity constraints). Little is known about the magnitude of either effect. 
Thus, while it is possible to construct examples in which the costs of deficits 
are large, more natural choices of parameter values  suggest  considerably 
smaller costs, and there are sets of parameter values that are not obviously 
unreasonable that imply substantial benefits  to deficits. 
Finally, the tax smoothing model suggests costs of excessive deficits that 
are substantially smaller than those that can be obtained from the first two 
models,  but  that  are  nonetheless  not  negligible.  For  a  typical  set  of 
parameter values,  the cost of running a deficit of 4 percent of GNP for 10 
years is about 50 billion dollars-about  2 percent of a year's consumption. 
In all three models,  the costs of an excessively large deficit rise approx- 
imately linearly with the length of time that the deficit is allowed to persist. 
Moreover,  in the first model  (but not in the other two)  the costs  can be 
reduced considerably by retiring the new debt at a moderate rate once the 
period of high deficits is ended.  Thus, the results support the view that the 
costs  of excessive  deficits are steady  and cumulative,  as opposed  to the 
view that excessive  deficits for a few years are relatively harmless but that 
the costs rise rapidly as the period that the problem remains uncorrected 
lengthens. 
What, in the end, can one conclude from this analysis concerning current 
U.S.  fiscal policy? If one is not willing to take a stand on the underlying 
assumptions  of the various models  considered in this paper, then at this 
point  little can be  said about the costs  of the  current deficits.  There are 
reasons  that the  deficit might  have  large costs,  reasons  that its welfare 
effects might  be  small,  and  even  reasons  that it might  have  substantial 
benefits.  If, on the other hand,  one accepts the propositions  that present 
and  future consumers  are less  than perfectly linked and  that the capital 
stock is  too  low,  then  the  analysis  of this paper implies  that there is  a 
channel  through which  the deficit has large costs.  Thus any case for the 
deficit, whether economic or political, must rest on an argument that there 
are large offsetting benefits.  In the absence of such benefits,  the deficit is 
very harmful and its harms are growing steadily. 68 *  ROMER 
2. The  Burden  on Future  Generations 
2.1 FRAMEWORK 
In this section  I investigate  the costs of excessive  deficits,  assuming  that 
deficits affect social welfare by transferring wealth  from future to current 
generations.  A policy of lower taxes today and higher taxes in the future 
reduces  the  present  value  of  taxes  paid  by  those  currently living  and 
increases the value of taxes paid by those born in the future; in addition, it 
reduces the capital stock and thereby increases interest rates and decreases 
wages,  again helping  current generations  at the expense  of future ones. 
Because  this type  of policy  has  distributional effects,  Pareto rankings of 
alternative policies are generally not possible.  But if one is willing to make 
judgments  about our relative valuations of the welfares of different indi- 
viduals  (as is done,  for example,  in standard analyses  of the  "Modified 
Golden Rule"), one  can determine the effects of policy changes  on social 
welfare. 
The particular model that I use in this section follows  Blanchard (1985) 
and  Weil  (1987a,b).  The  model  is  set  in  continuous  time.  There  is  a 
continual arrival of new  agents; nent agents are born at time t. Following 
Blanchard, all agents living at any time have the same expected remaining 
length  of life; thus  I abstract from life cycle effects.4 In fact, I adopt  the 
stronger assumption,  due  to Weil, that agents  never leave the economy; 
that is, agents have infinite horizons. As described below,  assuming  finite 
horizons  does  not  change  the  central results.  Thus,  the  magnitude  of 
intergenerational effects depends  simply on the rate of population growth 
n. Because the model is presented by Weil, I simply sketch it here. 
2.1.1 Individual  Behavior.  Consider an agent born at time d. The agent has 
constant elasticity of substitution utility: 
U  e 
t-a)' C(t;d)1'- 
U=  e-t-d)  dt,  >  0,  0>0.  (2.1) 
t=d  1  -  0 
4. The obvious  alternative  would be to assume that  all agents have some fixed lifespan,  and 
thus that remaining  length of life declines  one-for-one  with age. In fact,  because  expected 
years  until  death  decrease  less than  one-for-one  with age, the truth  is somewhere  between 
the two cases. I assume a constant  remaining  length of life because it is much simpler. 
Auerbach  and Kotlikoff  (1987)  analyze  the consequences  of a variety  of fiscal  policy  changes 
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8 is the discount rate, 0 the coefficient of relative risk aversion (the inverse 
of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution),  and C(t;d) consumption  at 
time t of an agent born at d. 
The  agent  supplies  one  unit  of  labor  inelastically.  I  allow  for  the 
possibility  of  labor-augmenting  technological  progress  at  rate g,  so  the 
number of units of "effective labor" the individual supplies  at t is egt. Let 
w(t) be the wage  per efficiency unit of labor, T(t) the level of (lump-sum) 
taxes per efficiency unit,  and C(t;d)  consumption  per efficiency unit (thus 
C(t;d) = C(t;d)leXt).  In addition let r(t) be the instantaneous real interest rate 
at t, and let r(t) =  r(t) -  g. Thus we can rewrite lifetime utility as 
U  =  e( 
-  gd  e(t-d)  C(td)  dt  (2.') 
t=d  1  -0 
where  8 =  S -  (1  -  0)g. The individual's  lifetime budget  constraint is 
C(t;d)e-R(dt)  dt =  [w(t) -  T(t)]e-R(dt)  dt,  (2.2) 
t=d  t=d 
rt2 
where  R(tl,t2)  =  f(q)dq. 
j  q=tl 
The solution to the individual's lifetime utility-maximization problem is 
described by Blanchard and Weil. Several facts about the utility-maximizing 
consumption  program in a steady state are noted here for future reference. 
The marginal propensity  to consume  out of wealth  is constant both over 
time and across individuals of different ages at the same time; it is given by 
r -  [(f -  8)/0]  c. At time t, the wealth of an individual born at d (per unit 
of effective labor) is 
e(r-8)(t-d)/6  T 
(2.3) 
The level of utility that an individual born at date d who has wealth W per 
unit of effective labor at age a can attain over the rest of his life (discounted 
back to the time of his birth) is 
-W1- 6 
U(W, a, d)  =  e(~  -  gd e-  c-8  .  (2.4)  1-  0 
From (2.3) and (2.4), the marginal utility of wealth is 70 *  ROMER 
au  w  -  T  - 
=  C-  -  ae(l-gd  -  T  (2.5)  aw  (2.5) 
2.1.2 Aggregate  Behavior.  Wealth equals financial plus human wealth (i.e., 
discounted  future labor income), 
W(t)  =  WF(t) +  WH(t),  (2.6) 
and financial wealth in turn consists of bonds and capital, 
WF(t) =  B(t) +  K(t).  (2.7) 
Bonds and capital are perfect substitutes. 
Financial wealth evolves  according to 
WF(t)  =  (f(t)  -  n)WF(t) +  [w(t)  -  T(t)]  -  C(t);  (2.8) 
the first term reflects interest income and population  growth,  the second 
labor income,  and  the  third spending.  The change  in human  wealth  is 
given by 
WH(t)  =  f(t)WH(t)  -  [w(t)  -  T(t)];  (2.9) 
f(t)  appears  rather than  r(t)-  n because  new  individuals  have  human 
wealth. 
2.1.3 Government.  For convenience,  government  spending  is assumed  to 
be  zero.  The  dynamics  of  the  stock  of  government  bonds  (per unit  of 
effective labor) are given by 
B(t) =  (f(t) -  n)B(t) -  T(t).  (2.10) 
2.1.4  Production  and Capital.  Output  net  of  depreciation  is  given  by  a 
conventional  constant  return to scale production function  of capital and 
effective labor. Output per unit of effective labor is thus given by 
Y(t) = f(K(t)),  (2.11) 
f'(  ) >  0, f"(  )  < 0. Investment is output minus consumption: 
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Finally, factors are paid their marginal products: 
r(t) = f'(K(t)),  (2.13) 
w(t)  =  f(K(t))  -  r(t)K(t).  (2.14) 
It is straightforward to extend the model  to allow for the possibility of 
some  domestic  assets being owned  by foreigners (or foreign assets being 
owned  domestically). Specifically, if it is assumed that net foreign holdings 
of domestic  assets  (per unit of effective labor) can be written simply as a 
function of r, AF(t) = AF(r(t)),  then the model holds essentially as before.5 
AF( . ) =  oo  would  correspond to the case of a small open  economy  that 
must take the world interest rate as given; AF( . ) =  0 would correspond to 
an economy  that is, at the margin, closed. 
2.1.5  Social Welfare  Function.  The  social welfare  function  that  I use  to 
weight changes in the utilities of different individuals is the usual one. Let 
Uo(d)  be the lifetime utility of an individual born at d. Then the measure of 
social welfare is 
SW  =  e-  nend  Uo(d)dd.  (2.15) 
d d=-oo 
,/ is the rate at which the utility of future individuals is discounted.  A case 
that may be of special interest is ,B =  0, which means that individuals are 
weighted  equally regardless of their date of birth. For example, (2.15) with 
,3 =  0 is  the  social welfare  function  that agents  would  agree  on  as  the 
appropriate one for policy choices if they could somehow  select the social 
welfare function before knowing  their dates of birth.6 
5. If  A(t)  denotes  financial  assets  held domestically,  (2.7)  becomes  A(t) + AF(r(t)) =B(t) + K(t). 
In addition,  (2.12)  must  be modified  to account  for  the fact  that  r(t)AF(r(t))  of output  accrues 
to foreign asset holders and for changes in foreign holdings,  AF(t) =  AF'(r(t))f "(K(t))K(t). 
6. The standard  way of writing  social  welfare  is as a function  of the utilities  of representative 
members  of each generation: 
t co 
SW =  e-  Uo(d)dd. 
j  d=-o 
This formulation is obviously equivalent to (2.15) with  3 =  f, -  n. I adopt the formulation 
in (2.15) on the grounds that it is more natural  to think of individuals, rather than 
generations,  as the fundamental  objects  of concern. 72 *  ROMER 
Alternatively,  focusing  on  social welfare  from  time  0 forward,  social 
welfare can be written as 
rx  ro00 
SW =  i  egne-na  V(a)da +  J  e-  nendUo(d)dd,  (2.15') 
a=O  d=0 
where V(a) denotes the utility from time 0 forward, discounted  back  to the  date 
of birth, of an agent of age a at time 0. The first term of (2.15') reflects the 
utilities of those  alive at time 0 and the second  term the utilities of those 
born after t =  0.7 
One  can show  that the usual  "Modified Golden  Rule" (Phelps,  1966) 
holds in this model: if /  +  0g is greater than or equal to the growth rate of 
the economy,  g +  n, the optimal steady state interest rate is  3 +  g =  r*;  if 
/3 +  6g < g +  n, on the other hand, no optimal policy exists. When r is not 
equal  to  r*, redistributions  among  agents  of  different ages  affect social 
welfare. From (2.5), in steady state the marginal utility of wealth at time t 
for an agent born at d is e-'te(r-  g)d  c-((w-T)Ir)-9;  the marginal effect on 
social welfare of wealth of this agent is thus e-'te(r  -0g-3)dc-((w-T)/rf)-0.  If 
r >  3 +  0g this expression is increasing in d-redistribution  from older to 
younger agents increases the social welfare function. Intuitively, when  r is 
high,  older agents  have  been  able to save  at a high  rate of return for a 
considerable  length  of  time,  and  thus  have  low  marginal  utilities  of 
consumption. 
2.1.6 Policy  Changes.  In what follows I analyze the effects of temporary tax 
cuts  on  social welfare.  Starting in a steady  state at time zero,  for some 
interval H taxes are low and the stock of government debt is rising; at time 
H taxes are raised to the level needed  to keep the debt constant.  Specifi- 
cally, the basic policy experiment that I consider is reducing taxes so that 
7. As Calvo  and Obstfeld  (1987)  discuss, failing  to discount  the utilities  of those alive at time 
0 back  to their  dates of birth  would lead to time  inconsistency.  The integral  in (2.15)  often 
diverges.  In fact, what I do below is to compare  policies  using the measure 
ASW =  e-  dnend(Uo(d)  -  ULo(d))dd, 
C d=-O 
where Uo(d)  and Ug(d)  are the lifetime  utilities  of an individual  born at d under the two 
policies  being compared.  See Phelps (1966)  for a discussion  of the appropriateness  of this 
procedure  despite the fact  that (2.15)  may diverge. Excessive  Deficits  *  73 
the stock of debt, B, rises at some  steady rate AT over the interval (0, H), 
followed  by a tax increase at H to keep B constant thereafter. Thus: 
B()  t 
< 
H  (2.16)  v/ 
(t  =0O  t  H. 
The implications of this policy for the path of taxes can be found using the 
government  budget  constraint (2.10): 
TSS _ 
-  AT + (r(t) -  n)tT  O  t <  H 
T(t)  =  (r(t)  -  n)B(t)  -  B(t)  [TSS  + (i(t)-  n)HAT  t-H,  lTss  +  (f(t)  -  n)HAT  t ?  H, 
(2.17) 
where  "ss" denotes  a steady state value. 
Under (2.16)-(2.17), taxes are adjusted during the period of the tax cut to 
pay  the  interest on  the  additional debt,  and  so  the  stock of debt grows 
linearly,  rather than  exponentially.  I focus  on  this  case  because  recent 
policy has not involved steadily growing deficits. Below I briefly discuss the 
effects of not adjusting taxes during the period of the tax cut. 
I also consider the implications of gradually retiring the additional debt 
created by the tax cut, rather than maintaining the stock of debt at its higher 
level after H. Specifically, I consider policies of form: 
A() 
T  t 
(2.18) 
(t)  e-  ?t-H)HAT  t>  H.  (218) 
If a >  0, B(t) returns asymptotically to its initial level. 
2.2 CONSTANT  REAL  INTEREST  RATE 
In this section I assume that the real interest rate is fixed. This corresponds 
either to the case of an economy that is at the margin completely open,  or, 
less  plausibly,  to the  case of perfect substitutability between  capital and 
labor. This assumption  has two advantages.  First, it permits considerable 
progress to be made analytically. Second, since it implies that future wages 
are  unaffected  by  current  policy,  it  allows  me  to  focus  on  the  direct 
distributional  effects  of  deficits.  Moreover,  given  the  extent  of  capital 
mobility, it is probably only moderately unrealistic. 
2.2.1 General  Results.  The first step in finding the effect of the policy on 
social welfare is to compute its impact on the wealth of various generations. 
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x 
AW(t) =  e-r(s-t)[Tss  -  T(s)]ds,  t -  0.  (2.19) 
j  s=t 
For an individual born at date d  :  0, AW(d)  is the effect of the policy on his 
lifetime wealth.  In addition, AW(0) is the effect on the wealth as of time 0 
of individuals living at zero. AW(t)  can be found by substituting (2.17) into 
(2.19). The effect of the policy on social welfare can then be found  using 
(2.3) and (2.4): 
r0 
ASW =  ene-na  [U(e(r-8)a/,Wo +  AW(O),  a,  -a) 
a= 
-  U(e(r-  )a/eWo, a,  -a)]da 
+  e-ttnent  [U(Wo +  AW(t), 0, t)  -  U(Wio,  0, t)]dt,  (2.20) 
J t=O 
where  Wo =  (w -  TS)/r  and where  U(W,a,d), given  in (2.4), is the utility 
from age a forward (discounted to the date of birth) of an individual born 
at d with wealth  W at age a. The first term of (2.20) gives the effect of the 
policy on the welfare of those living at the time the policy is announced, 
and the second  term shows  the impact on those born after t =  0. 
To convert (2.20) into understandable units, I define X to be the marginal 
effect on  social welfare of an increase in all individuals'  consumption  at 
t =  0. From (2.5) and (2.15), 
X =  e  ane-nac-  Wo0  ?  e-  ae-(1 -  gada 
o a=O 
nc-  Wl 
+  (2.21)  n  +  r  +  (1  -  0)g -  t 
In what follows  I focus on the measure 
-  ASW 
L  ,  (2.22) 
xC(0) 
where  C(0) is  aggregate  consumption  at time  0.  Thus,  I normalize  the 
change  in  social welfare by the  "marginal social utility of consumption" 
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mean,  if time  is  measured  in  years,  that the  social welfare  cost  of  the 
temporary increase in deficit spending was equivalent (loosely speaking) to 
losing half a year's consumption. 
2.2.2  First Order Approximations. Because  lifetime  wealth  is  large,  the 
impact  of  even  a  fairly  substantial  tax  cut  on  individuals'  wealths  is 
generally small. In this case the change in an individual's utility can be well 
approximated by  his  marginal utility of wealth  times  the  change  in his 
wealth. 
To  interpret  the  welfare  costs  of  tax  cuts,  it  is  useful  to  begin  by 
considering  a temporary (i.e.,  momentary) tax cut of amount AT at t =  0 
that is repaid H periods later, where H is small. Each of the nH people born 
during (0,H) loses AT;  each person alive at t = 0 gains nHAT dollars. Thus 
the amount transferred is proportional to n. If r exceeds r*, transfers from 
younger  to older individuals are undesirable. The larger the difference in 
age,  the more undesirable the transfer. Here the transfer is from individ- 
uals  born  at  approximately  t =  0  to  individuals  alive at  t =  0.  But  the 
average age of individuals alive at t =  0 is decreasing in n; specifically, it is 
/n.  Thus, when  r >  r*, the ratio of the marginal social values  of a unit of 
wealth to the newborn and of a unit of wealth to those alive is decreasing 
in n; one  can show  that it is 1 +  (r-r*)/n.  Thus, although  the size of the 
transfer is falling in n, the social welfare cost per unit is rising. The overall 
welfare effect of the policy change is (approximately) 
AT 
L  (r  -  r*)H  .  (2.23) 
C(0) 
The two effects balance, and so the size of a deficit's impact on consump- 
tion, to a first approximation, is not relevant to its welfare cost. 
The  welfare  effects  of  a  tax cut  over  (0,H) with  the  additional  debt 
permanently  rolled over after H differ from those  of a momentary  cut at 
t =  0 that is fully repaid at H for two reasons. First, because the future tax 
increase to balance the present cut is spread out rather than concentrated at 
H, more of the burden of paying for the tax cut falls on future generations. 
Second, with the policy of a permanently higher debt the transfer to those 
who  are living at 0 is from all future generations,  rather than from those 
born during (0,H); with r >  r*, this is less desirable. Equation (2.5) giving 
the  marginal  utility  of  wealth,  equation  (2.19)  giving  the  changes  in 
individuals'  wealths,  and  equation  (2.15) giving  social welfare,  together 
with  the additional assumption  that H is small, can be used  to derive an 
approximation to the effect of the tax cut on social welfare. The resulting 
expression  is 76 *  ROMER 
r -  r*  AT 
L-  =  H  .  (2.24) 
r* -  (n  +  g)  C(0) 
Because the  policy  of a tax cut over  (0,H) followed  by a permanently 
higher  stock of debt  after H (with permanently  higher  taxes to pay  the 
additional interest) involves reducing the wealths of all future generations, 
and because  r >  r* implies that the marginal effect on social welfare of a 
given  transfer (in present  value  terms) rises as we  consider  generations 
further in the future, (2.24) can be quite large. Recall that the condition for 
an optimal policy to exist is r*  -  n + g. As r* -  (n + g) approaches zero, 
(2.24) diverges.  For example,  H =  15, AT/C(0) =  0.6, r -  r  =  0.4, /3 =  0, 
n =  .01, g =  .02,  and  0 =  3 imply  L -  1.2.  The  same  parameter values 
with  0 =  1.5 imply that L diverges. 
Because the large welfare costs stem to a considerable extent from the 
effects  of  the  policies  on  generations  in  the  distant  future,  even  very 
gradual retirement of the debt can substantially lower  L. Equation (2.18) 
describes policies where  the debt created by the tax cut is retired at some 
rate a after time H. One can show that for general a the formula analogous 
to (2.24) is 
r -  r*  AT 
L -  H  .  (2.24') 
a  +  r* -  (n  +  g)  C(0) 
For the same parameter values as before (with 0 =  3), raising a from 0 to 
.014 (so that half the debt is retired in 50 years) lowers  L from 1.2 to  .8; 
a =  .035 (half is retired in 20 years) lowers L to .6. For 0 =  1.5, L is 2.6 for 
a  =  .014 (50 years),  1.0 for a  =  .035 (20 years),  and  .5 for a =  .069 (10 
years).  In the  case  of both  world  wars,  more  than  half of  the  wartime 
increase in the ratio of federal debt to GNP had been reversed within ten 
years after the end of the war. Thus, a half-life of as little as ten years does 
not appear unreasonable.8 
It is important to note that because  the source of the welfare effects is 
transfers among generations, introducing factors that would cause tax cuts 
to have a larger impact on consumption  would  not significantly affect the 
welfare costs.  For example,  if we  simply make the arbitrary assumption 
8. (2.24') implies that the costs are minimized when  a is set to infinity-that  is, when  the debt 
is retired immediately by a large onetime levy at H. Considerations outside the scope of the 
model, such as the fact that taxes are not lump sum and the fact that taxes may affect output 
through  aggregate  demand,  suggest  that such  a policy  is  unrealistic. Thus,  although  I 
discuss the a  =  o case briefly below,  I do not focus on this case. (Also, as described below, 
the approximation in (2.24') is unreliable when  a is large.) Excessive  Deficits  *  77 
that individuals consume  their disposable labor income,  (2.24) and (2.24') 
are unchanged.  Thus, if the source of welfare costs of temporary tax cuts is 
transfers among generations and if r is fixed, then to first order large effects 
of current income on consumption  do not alter the welfare costs. 
Finally, assuming  that lifetimes are finite rather than infinite also does 
not  change  the  results.  Specifically,  following  Blanchard, suppose  that 
death is a Poisson process with arrival rate p; that is, the probability of an 
individual alive at t living to t' is e-p(t  -t).  Suppose also that individuals hold 
all wealth as annuities. Then the central results are unchanged: the optimal 
interest rate is r* =  /3 +  Og,  and formulas (2.24) and (2.24') hold as before 
(where  n continues  to denote  the  rate of population  growth).  Thus  the 
assumption  of infinite horizons is unimportant to the results. 
2.2.3 Exact  Results.  To find the effect of excessive deficits on social welfare 
in  this  model  without  using  Taylor approximations,  the  integral giving 
ASW-equation  (2.20)-must  be evaluated numerically. I focus throughout 
on  the  case  of  AT/C(O)  = 0.06-taxes  are  cut  by  6  percent  of  initial 
consumption.  (For the  United  States  this  corresponds  to  a  tax  cut  of 
approximately 4 percent of GNP.) As baseline values of the other param- 
eters,  I set  the  coefficient of  relative risk aversion  (0) to  3,  the  rate of 
labor-augmenting technological progress (g) to 2 percent, the rate of arrival 
of new agents (n) to 1 percent, the social planner's discount rate (/3)  to zero, 
and the marginal product of capital net of depreciation (r) to 10 percent. I 
choose T so that the initial debt-to-GNP ratio is .4. Finally, I choose 8 so that 
the  steady  state capital-output ratio is 2.5; the implied  value  is approxi- 
mately 3 percent. I consider five possible values for the length of time that 
taxes are reduced:  1, 5,  10, 15, and  20. In addition  to finding  L for the 
baseline case, I also consider the effects of varying 0, g, n,  3, and r. For each 
set  of parameter values  I adjust  8 so  that the  initial capital-output ratio 
remains equal to 2.5; the implied values of 6 range from .3 percent to 6.2 
percent. 
Tables 1-4 report the results. In Table 1 (in which it is assumed  that the 
debt is permanently rolled over after the end of the tax cut), the first order 
approximation  derived  above-L  -  [(r -  r*)/(r*  -  n -  g)]H[AT/C(0)] 
provides a relatively good  guide to the exact results. When the additional 
debt  is  gradually  retired  after  the  end  of  the  tax  cut  (Table 2),  the 
approximation in (2.24') provides a good measure of the actual costs of the 
policy for all of the cases considered,  except instantaneous  retirement at 
time H (a  =  oo).  For a  =  oo,  temporary deficits have potentially large costs 
even though (2.24') implies L =  0. One can show that including the second 
order terms in H in the approximation implies that for the case of a =  o, 78 *  ROMER 
L  /2(r  -  r*)H2[AT/C(O)]  (see (2.23)); thus, with immediate repayment the 
costs of excessive deficits increase with the square of the deficits' duration. 
Table 3 shows  that for sets of parameter values that imply that the initial 
steady state is optimal (and thus the costs of deficits are second order), the 
welfare costs of deficits are generally small. Finally, Table 4 considers the 
effects of not  adjusting  taxes over  (0,H) to pay  the  interest on  the  debt 
created  by  the  tax cut.  Thus,  in  this  case  T(t) is  simply  TS  -  AT for 
0 <  t <  H and  TS  +  (eH  -  1)AT for t  > H.  Under  this  policy  the  stock  of 
government  debt  grows  exponentially  rather than  linearly  during  the 
period (0,H). Table 4 shows,  not surprisingly, that the effect of this change 
is small if H is small, but can be substantial if H is large. 
The  approximations  in  equations  (2.24)-(2.24')  and  the  exact  results 
presented  in  Tables 1-4  show  that if r differs substantially from r*, the 
Table  1  THE  COSTS  OF EXCESSIVE  DEFICITS 
Parameter  Values  H 
P(%)  g(%)  n(%)  r(%)  0  8(%)  r-r*(%)  1  5  10  15  20 
Baseline  Case 
0  2  1  10  3  3.3  4  .080  .388  .753  1.097  1.421 
Effects  of Varying 0 
2  1  10  2  5.5  6  .360 






Effects  of Varying  r 
0.5  1  .020 
7.8  9  .180 
1.805  3.621  5.450  7.296 
.114  .216  .306  .387 
.096  .184  .266  .340 
.914  1.862  2.855  3.911 
Effects  of Varying  n 
3.9  4  .061  .292  .559 
2.5  4  .120  .593  1.172 







Effects  of Varying  g 
0  1  1  10  3  6.2  7  .422 
0  3  1  10  3  0.3  1  .012 
Effects  of Varying 38 
1  2  1  10  3  3.3  3  .044 
3  2  1  10  3  3.3  1  .010 
2.151  4.411  6.792  9.311 
.056  .105  .148  .184 
.214  .406  .578  .734 
.046  .086  .119  .146 
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Table 2  THE EFFECTS  OF RETIRING  THE DEBT 
Time  after  the  end  of the  tax  cut  after  which  half  the  additional  debt  has  been 
retired,  in years 
(implied  value  of a) 
?o  50  20  10  0 
H  (0)  (.0139)  (.0347)  (.0693)  (oo) 
1  .080  .055  .037  .025  .001 
5  .388  .272  .193  .135  .028 
10  .753  .539  .398  .295  .106 
15  1.097  .802  .611  .474  .224 
20  1.421  1.059  .830  .668  .373 
See note to Table  1. Parameter  values  are /=0,  g=2%, n=1%,  r=10%,  0=3, 6=3.3%  (r-r*=4%). 
Table 3  THE COSTS OF EXCESSIVE  DEFICITS-r=r  CASE 
Parameter  Values  H 
/3(%)  g(%)  n(%)  r(%)  0  8(%)  1  5  10  15  20 
Baseline  Case 
4  2  1  10  3  3.3  .0001  .001  .004  .008  .012 
Effects  of Changes  in Parameter  Values 
4  2  1  12  4  2.8  .0001  .002  .006  .010  .015 
4  2  2  10  3  2.5  .0001  .002  .008  .015  .022 
4  1  1  7  3  3.5  .0001  .001  .004  .008  .013 
2  2  1  8  3  1.4  .0001  .001  .004  .008  .013 
See note to Table 1. 
Table 4  THE EFFECTS  OF NOT ADJUSTING TAXES TO PAY THE INTEREST 
ON THE ADDITIONAL DEBT 
Taxes  Not 
H  Taxes  Adjusted  Adjusted 
1  .080  .082 
5  .388  .467 
10  .753  1.116 
15  1.097  2.076 
20  1.421  3.644 
See note to Table  1. Parameter  values  are 3=0,  g=2%, li=1%,  r=10%,  0=3, 6=3.3%  (r-*=4%). 80 *  ROMER 
welfare costs of excessive  deficits can be very large. The welfare costs of a 
tax cut of 6 percent of initial consumption  lasting ten years with the debt 
permanently rolled over can easily reach a year's consumption for plausible 
parameter values.  To put it differently, the cost of a tax cut of 180 billion 
dollars per year for ten years may exceed  three trillion dollars. Gradual 
retirement of the debt after the tax cut is reversed can substantially reduce 
their welfare costs, but still leave them large. Retiring the debt with a half- 
life of ten years, for example, might cut the costs in half-from  roughly a 
year's consumption  to half a year's, or, stated differently, from roughly 3 
trillion dollars to 1.5 trillion. While the character  of this social cost of deficits 
is  different  from  those  that  are  usually  emphasized  (since  it  involves 
distribution, rather than efficiency), the results follow from a fairly widely 
held view-that  the capital stock is too low-with  quite modest additional 
assumptions. 
Finally, the approximations and exact results suggest  that the costs  of 
excessive  deficits mount  steadily as the deficits persist. Equations (2.24)- 
(2.24'), in fact, show  that the costs are approximately linear in the horizon 
of  the  tax cut.  Thus,  there  are no  "crises" in  the  model,  only  steadily 
mounting  costs.  Indeed,  the model  implies that even  after the tax cut is 
ended,  its harms can be greatly mitigated by rapid repayment of the debt. 
2.3 ENDOGENOUS  REAL  INTEREST  RATE 
I now briefly consider the implications of relaxing the assumption  that the 
real  interest  rate  is  fixed.  That  is,  I  will  assume  that  the  increased 
consumption  caused by a tax cut reduces investment and thereby increases 
the real interest rate and drives down the wage. This will occur (assuming 
that capital and labor are not perfect substitutes) either if capital is less than 
perfectly mobile, or if the economy  is not negligible in comparison to the 
world; in the case of the United States, both conditions appear to hold. 
If the real interest rate and the wage  are not fixed, a temporary tax cut 
will affect social welfare not only through the direct distributional effects 
that  are the  focus  of  Section  2.2,  but  also  through  its  effect  on  factor 
payments.  Increased consumption  raises the real interest rate and lowers 
the real wage,  thereby helping  suppliers of capital and harming suppliers 
of labor; since capital is held by those currently living, this effect, like the 
direct  distributional  effect,  tends  to  benefit  present  generations  at  the 
expense  of future ones. 
When  r  is  endogenous,  I  am  not  able  to  solve  analytically  for  the 
response  of  the  economy  to  a  change  in  fiscal policy.  I therefore  use 
numerical solutions  throughout.  I assume  that production is Cobb-Doug- 
las. I ignore international capital flows; increased consumption is translated 
one-for-one  into  reduced  investment.  Given  actual capital mobility,  my Excessive  Deficits.  81 
assumptions  of Cobb-Douglas production and of no capital flows  almost 
surely imply unrealistically large effects of increased consumption  on factor 
payments.  Thus, this model and the fixed real interest rate model  should 
be viewed  as extremes,  with  the truth almost certainly lying somewhere 
between  the two. 
I assume  a capital share of one quarter; thus a capital-output ratio of 2.5 
implies r =  10 percent. I choose the remaining parameters as before: 0 =  3, 
g =  2  percent,  n =  1  percent,  /3 =  0,  and  T and  8 so  that  the  initial 
bond-output  and capital-output ratios are .4 and 2.5. 
For these parameter values the endogeneity  of r has only a modest effect 
on  the  welfare  costs  of  deficits.  For a  tax  cut  of  6  percent  of  initial 
consumption  for ten years,  with  the additional debt permanently  rolled 
over thereafter, L -  .851 when  r is endogenous  and L  = .753 when  r is 
fixed at 10 percent.  This small effect is not surprising. The tax cuts affect 
consumption  only because present and future consumers are not perfectly 
linked; since  those  links are strong,  consumption  changes  only  slightly. 
The long-run effect of the policy is to raise the real interest rate by 13 basis 
points and lower the real wage by 1/2  percent. 
When the links between  generations are weaker the effects of tax cuts on 
consumption  are greater, and thus the consequences  of letting r change as 
K changes  are also greater. Suppose,  for example, that n =  4 percent and 
,3 =  2 percent and that the other parameters are as before. (I set  3  >  0 so 
that 8 +  0g >  n + g.) For this case, L is approximately .582 if r is fixed and 
.947 if r is endogenous.  In the long run the policy raises r by 53 basis points 
and lowers the wage by 1.7 percent. 
Finally, I ask whether  letting r vary alters the welfare costs of tax cuts 
significantly when  the  economy  begins  in the  optimal  steady  state.  For 
n =  1 percent,  3 = 4 percent, and the other parameters as before (so that 
initially r =  r*), L -  .006 when  r is fixed and L -  .018 when  r is endoge- 
nous.  For n =  4 percent and /  = 4 percent, L is approximately .014 for r 
exogenous  and .063 for r endogenous. 
I conclude that allowing for the possibility of the increased consumption 
brought about by temporary tax cuts driving up the interest rate has only 
modest effects on the welfare costs of excessive deficits. Even if the arrival 
rate of new  agents is 4 percent and production is Cobb-Douglas with  no 
international capital flows-both  of which almost surely overstate greatly 
the impact of deficits on the interest rate through imperfect links between 
present  and  future consumers-the  welfare costs of deficits are not dra- 
matically larger than they  are when  the interest rate is fixed.  Thus,  the 
central source of welfare costs of fiscal policy mistakes in this model is the 
direct distributional effect of those  policies.  As  described in Section 2.2, 
those  costs are likely to be substantial. 82 *  ROMER 
3. Liquidity  Constraints 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In traditional macroeconomic models and in many informal discussions  of 
the  effects  of  deficits,  temporary  tax  cuts  are  assumed  to  have  large 
contemporaneous  effects on consumption.  Although  the results of formal 
econometric investigations  of this issue  are mixed,  some  studies  provide 
support for this view.  Campbell and Mankiw (1987), for example, conclude 
that  the  path  of  aggregate  consumption  behaves  as  though  it  were 
determined  as  roughly  the  average  of  permanent  income  and  current 
income. In this section I investigate the costs of deficits in a model in which 
temporary  tax  cuts  have  large  effects  on  consumption.  Specifically,  I 
assume  that  some  consumers  would  like  to  consume  more  than  their 
current income,  but are unable to do the needed  borrowing. By lowering 
taxes today and raising them in the future, the government in effect lends 
to private agents and thus relaxes the liquidity constraints that they face. 
The interaction between  liquidity constraints and government  tax policy 
can be complex. Hayashi (1986) and Yotsuzuka (1987) show  that there are 
natural  models  of  endogenous  liquidity  constraints  in  which  liquidity 
constraints respond to tax cuts in just such a way as to leave consumption 
unchanged.  At  the  same  time,  this result is not general  (see  Bernheim, 
1987, and Yotsuzuka). Because my goal is to develop  a model that can be 
embedded  in a larger model  of the economy  and that can be used  to do 
quantitative  welfare  analysis,  I  do  not  attempt  to  build  a  model  of 
endogenous  liquidity constraints arising from, for example, adverse selec- 
tion. Instead, I simply assume that for some reason-such  as the existence 
of bankruptcy laws-lenders  are unwilling to lend to individuals with zero 
financial wealth. The essential feature of this assumption is that the amount 
that individuals can borrow does not change in response  to temporary tax 
cuts. The results that follow would be weakened  but not changed qualita- 
tively if liquidity constraints adjusted to weaken somewhat  the stimulating 
effects of tax cuts on consumption. 
In the absence of some  offsetting cost, temporary tax cuts in a world of 
liquidity constraints are desirable. I assume,  however,  that the shifting of 
consumption  from the future to the present that is caused by tax cuts does 
have a cost. Specifically, I assume that the social marginal product of capital 
exceeds  the  private marginal product,  and  thus  that there is a negative 
exterality  to reduced saving.  P. Romer (1987) defends  the assumption  of 
a positive externality to capital formation both theoretically and empirically Excessive  Deficits *  83 
and  argues  that  the  exterality  may  be  quite  large.  Finally,  for simplicity  I 
assume  that  the  marginal  product  of capital  is  fixed.9'10 
3.2 STEADY STATE 
The  economy  consists  of two  types  of infinitely-lived  agents;  the  two  types 
of agents  have  the  same  labor incomes  and  taxes  but  different  preferences 
and  thus  potentially  different  consumption  paths  and  asset  holdings.  Let r 
be  the  private real  interest  rate  and  g  the  rate  of  technical  progress,  and 
define  f  =  r -  g.  Let w be  the  wage,  T taxes,  Ci the  consumption  of a type 
i individual,  and  Ai the  financial  wealth  of a type  i individual;  all variables 
are  measured  relative  to  the  size  of  the  economy  (that  is,  divided  by  egt). 
Finally,  let  "ss" denote  a steady  state  value. 
An  individual  of  type  i has  the  utility  function 
^  -t  Ci(t)  l- 
Ui  e-i  ,  '  O0,  0>  (i  =  1,2).  (3.1) 
t=O  1-0 
9. The results  of Section  2.3 suggest that  with a small  effect  of deficits  on consumption  and 
extreme  assumptions  about how changes in consumption  affect the interest rate, the 
welfare  costs of deficits  are only moderately  larger  than they are when the interest  rate  is 
fixed. It appears likely that the same would be true if deficits had a larger  effect on 
consumption (as is  likely to occur with liquidity constraints)  and if more realistic 
assumptions  were made about  the impact  of changes  in consumption  on the real  interest 
rate.  Thus,  the assumption  that  r is fixed,  although  not entirely  innocuous,  probably  does 
not greatly affect the results. Note also that since tax cuts have an advantage when  there 
are liquidity constraints, it appears that the net effect of adding liquidity constraints to the 
model of Section 2 would  be to reduce the welfare costs of tax cuts. 
10. If the mechanism by which tax cuts reduce welfare is negative exteralities  from increased 
consumption,  the magnitude of tax cuts' effect on consumption is obviously crucial to the 
results.  There are at least two  possible  means  other than liquidity constraints through 
which  temporary  tax cuts  could  have  large  effects  on  consumption.  The  first is  the 
interaction  between  uncertainty  and  the  non-lump-sum  nature  of  taxes  stressed  by 
Barsky, Mankiw, and Zeldes (1986). In a model integrating Barsky, Mankiw, and Zeldes's 
analysis with positive extemalities from capital, tax cuts would  again have an advantage 
and  a disadvantage;  in  this  case  the  advantage  would  be  increased  insurance  against 
uncertainty in future income.  It thus seems  plausible that the welfare implications of tax 
cuts in such a model would be broadly similar to their implications in the present model. 
Because formal analysis of these  issues  would  be quite complex,  I do not pursue  them 
further. 
The second alternative means through which temporary tax cuts could have large effects 
on consumption  is "irrational"  or "rule of thumb" consumption behavior (see for example 
Johnson, Kotlikoff, and Samuelson,  1987). In an economy of rule of thumb consumers and 
exteralities  from capital, temporary tax cuts  have  a disadvantage  without  necessarily 
having an offsetting advantage (since the change in consumers' spending  need not bring 
them closer to their privately optimal paths); thus the welfare costs of tax cuts are likely to 
be larger than in the present model. 84 *ROMER 
I assume  that type 1 individuals have a higher discount rate than do type 
2  individuals:  81 >  82. It  is  type  1  individuals  who  will  be  liquidity 
constrained.  Fraction f of individuals are of type 1. 
The consumption  that a type i individual would  choose  if not liquidity 
constrained is 
I vf"-  T"S  \ 
Cs  =  ci  +  Af)  (3.2) 
r-  i 
Ci =  r- 
Type 1 individuals are liquidity constrained and type 2 individuals are not. 
Thus their actual consumptions  are 
C  W=  wSS  -  TS,  (3.3) 
Cs2 =  c2  +  Ass  .  (3.4)  r 
The condition for liquidity constraints to be binding for type 1 individuals 
only  is  81 >  fr  82. In addition,  steady  state requires f =  82.  I therefore 
assume  81 >  f =  82. This implies c2 =  r. 
Since all financial wealth  is held by type 2 individuals  and  since they 
represent proportion 1 -  f  of the economy, 
(1  -  f)A~s =  Bss +  KS,  (3.5) 
where  B and K are the stocks of bonds and capital. In steady state, B and 
K must be constant: 
B =  Bss -  Ts  =  0,  (3.6) 
k  =  ss  -  (fCrs +  (1  -  f)CS)  =  0,  (3.7) 
where  Y is output less the investment  needed  to maintain K (gK). 
Let w? and r? denote  the social  marginal products of labor and capital. If 
r? exceeds  r, there are positive externalities to capital. Thus output minus 
gK is given by 
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where  f? =  r? -  g.  Finally,  the  wage  equals  output  less  payments  to 
capital: 
SS =  rS  -  PKSS. (3.9) 
Equations  (3.3)-(3.9)  describe  the  steady  state  of  the  economy.  The 
unknowns  are C1, C2, A2, B, K, Y, and w.  One  can show  that because 
output is linear in capital and because c2 = r, any level of K is a steady state 
value  (as long  as  B +  K :  0).  As  a result,  temporary  disturbances  can 
permanently  affect the capital stock. This makes the analysis of dynamics 
simpler.  It appears  that modifying  the  model  so  that there is  a unique 
steady state to which the economy  adjusts slowly would  not substantially 
alter the results. 
3.3 POLICY  CHANGES 
A  liquidity  constrained  individual  is  at a corner solution;  his  marginal 
propensity to consume is one. Thus, if taxes are cut in a way that causes the 
path of taxes to be smooth and if the tax cuts are sufficiently small, type 1 
(liquidity constrained) individuals  will continue  to always  consume  their 
current disposable income. Because the types of policy changes that we are 
interested in are of moderate size-several  percent of GNP-and  involve a 
path for taxes after the initial cut that is fairly steady, I focus on changes in 
tax policy that leave type 1 individuals' consumption  at a corner solution. 
A simple and tractable  way of modeling such policy changes is to assume 
that taxes are initially cut by some amount and then rise exponentially to a 
new  steady state level: 
T(t) =  Tss -  Ae-bt  +  A,  b >  0, A >  0.  (3.10) 
The constant term is chosen so that the stock of government debt does not 
diverge.  (Conditions on A and b and on the parameters of the model for it 
to be optimal for type  1 individuals  to always  consume  their disposable 
income are discussed  below.) 
To gauge the magnitude and duration of tax cuts of form (3.10), note that 
(3.10)  and  B(t) =  rB(t) -  T(t)  imply  that  B(t) =  [bl(f +  b)]Ae-b'  and 
limt,  B(t) =  Bss +  [A/(f +  b)]. In addition,  the weighted  average time of 
the increase in B is 1/b; that is, 
' 
I/  ^  .o  1 
tB(t)dt  B(t)dt  =  .  (3.11) 
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Thus the policy given by (3.10) is in some sense comparable to a tax cut that 
causes B to rise at rate [b/(f +  b)](A/2)  for length of time 2/b and then remain 
constant at BSS  +  [A/(r +  b)]. I therefore define  AT' =  [b/(r +  b)](A/2) and 
H'  =  2/b . 
3.4 THE  RESPONSE  OF THE  ECONOMY 
The  consumption  of  type  1  individuals  at  any  time  is  equal  to  their 
disposable  income: 
A 
Ci(t)  =  Cs? +  (fo  -  F)(K(t) -  Kss) +  [(r +  b)e-bt -  r]  (3.12) 
The second term reflects the effect of the policy change on the wage and the 
third term the effect on taxes. (I solve for K(t) below.) The consumption  of 
type 2 individuals is constant and equal to f times their wealth. The tax cut 
does  not affect their financial wealth at time zero or the present value of 
their taxes; it does,  however,  affect the present value of their labor income 
by changing the capital stock. Thus, 
(  xo 
C2(t)  =  CS  +  r  e-rt(f  -  r)(K(T)  -  KSS)dr  Vt.  (3.13) 
0  T=0 
The dynamics of K are given by 
K(t) =  Y(t) -  C(t) 
=  r?(K(t) -  KSS)  -  [f(C1(t) -  C1s) +  (1  -  f)(C2(t)  -  Cs)].  (3.14) 
The exponential path of taxes suggests  a path of the capital stock of form 
K(t) =  KSs -  (1  -  e-bt)Q.  (3.15) 
It is straightforward to show  that this solution satisfies (3.12)-(3.14) if Q is 
given by 
fA 
Q  =  f.  (3.16)  b +  (1  -  f)r?  +  fr  ) 
Q is the effect of the tax cut on the capital stock in the long run. (3.12)-(3.16) 
describe the impact of the tax cut on the economy. 
In the absence of liquidity constraints, type 1 consumers  would  choose 
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constraints  are always  binding  on  these  consumers  as long  as  (w -  T)/ 
(w -  T) always  exceeds  (f -  51)/0. One  can  show  that  necessary  and 
sufficient conditions  for this to occur are 
b +  f?  A 
b +  (1  -  f)rf  +  ff  wss -  Tss  -  r  <-- ,  ,  (3.17) 
b  A  0 
1+ 
b +  f  wss -  Tss 
and 
? -  r  r  A 
1-  f +  b0.  (3.18)  b +  (1 -  f)r?  + ff  r +  b  wss -  Tss 
3.5 WELFARE  EFFECTS 
We are now in a position to describe the effect of the policy change on social 
welfare.  As  before,  I proceed  by  first deriving  analytic approximations 
using first order approximations to utility and then finding the exact effects 
numerically. 
The marginal utility of consumption  of type  1 individuals  at time  t is 
e-'tCs  -  . Thus, from (3.12) and (3.15)-(3.16), the effect of the policy change 
on the welfare of type 1 consumers is approximately 
b  1 C s  -0r  (  1_-  o  )f 
AU,i -  CSS  b  -(f  -  )f  A.  (3.19) 
b +  1,  8,  r  +  b  b +  (1 -  f)r? + fF 
Similarly, from (3.13) and (3.15)-(3.16), 
1  r-  r  b 
A  U2  =  -(I5-  -  /A.  (3.20)  A 
) 
C2 
82  b +  (1  -  f)ff  +  fr  b +  r 
( 
Our standard measure of the cost of the tax cut is 
L =-  -  laAU1 
+  (1  -  a)AU2 
L0  +  (1  -  9  (3.21)  [a(Csl)-+  (1  -a)(Css)-j[fCss  + (1  -  f)Clss  1  ?r.2  1  2 88 *  ROMER 
where a is the weight attached  to the welfare  of type 1 agents. In the case 
of H' small, Cs -  CS, and a = f,l 
I  f  1  -  0  0  -  C~s  AT' 
L  (r? -  ) 
-  f+  1-  e-  Cl  -  fH'  .  (3.22) 
2/  S2  C  S  CSs 
The term  in F?  -  r reflects  the harms  of the tax  cuts through  reduced  capital 
formation while  the  term in  (Cs -  Cfs)/ICs  reflects the  cuts' benefits 
through relaxation  of the liquidity  constraints. 
I now turn to finding exact  values for L numerically.  As a baseline  case, 
I consider r =  2 =  7 percent, 0 =  3, AT'/CSS  =  .06, H' =  10, initial capital- 
output and bond-output ratios of 2.5 and .4 respectively, and 86 = 25 
percent; these  values imply (Cls  -  Cs)/Cs  s  .86 (this large difference 
between desired  and actual  consumption  is necessary  for  type 1 individuals 
to continue  to consume their  current  disposable  income in response to the 
large  tax  cut).  If  g = 3  percent,  the  unadjusted  discount  rates, 
Si =  8i +  (1 -  0)g,  are  82 =  3  percent  and  86 = 21  percent.  To  gauge 
possible values of r0  -  r, note that if r = 7 percent, g = 3 percent, and 
ro -  f = 30 percent, then an initial  capital-output  ratio  of 2.5 implies that 
the product of labor  is zero and that all output is produced  by capital.  I 
therefore  consider  values for F?  -  r ranging  from  0 to 30 percent;  values at 
the upper end of the range imply very large positive externalities  from 
capital.  I also consider  a wide range  of values of f; specifically,  I let f range 
from .1 to .9. 
Table  5 presents the results. The table shows that the welfare costs are 
likely to be negative for F?  -  r small  and positive  for F0  -  i large, with the 
magnitudes  only moderate  in both cases. For  the case of f = 1/2, L  is - .127 
for F?  -  F =  0 (the tax cuts are advantageous  in the absence of externali- 
ties), -.076  for F?  -  r =  5 percent, -.031  for F?  -  F =  10 percent, and .099 
for F"  -  f = 30 percent.  Substantial  changes in f do not dramatically  affect 
the results;  changing  f to .25 or .75, for example, changes L only moder- 
ately. 
The fact that the costs of the tax cuts are only moderate  when F?  -  f is 
large  reflects  a combination  of large  costs through  a lower capital  stock  and 
large benefits through relaxation  of liquidity  constraints.  For  f = 1/2 and 
r0 -  r = 30 percent, for example, the policy reduces wages by 1 percent 
11. a = f implies  that the  social welfare  function  puts  equal weights  on  the  instantaneous 
utilities at time 0 of individuals of each type (and thus, since 81 >  82, smaller weight on the 
instantaneous  utility of a type 1 than a type 2 individual at t >  0). Obviously other values 
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after a year and 6 percent in the long run. The cost of this change to type 
2 (unconstrained) consumers  is roughly half a year of their consumption. 
But  for  type  1  (constrained)  consumers  to  increase  their  consumption 
dramatically in response  to the large tax cut it is necessary  that they  be 
highly  liquidity constrained; thus (unless  0 is small) relaxing the liquidity 
constraints is very desirable. The net effect (particularly since Cls <  C2, so 
the marginal utility of consumption  for type  1 agents  is greater) is only 
modest costs to the tax cuts. For this case (f =  1/2, rP  -  r =  30 percent), the 
welfare cost of a deficit of 6 percent of initial consumption  for ten years is 
about 10 percent of a year's consumption,  or about 250 billion dollars-an 
amount  that is by no means  trivial, but that is dramatically less than the 
estimates from the model of Section 2. 
One way to increase L is to decrease both 6~ -  r and 0; this both makes 
the  benefit  of  relaxing  the  liquidity  constraints  smaller  for  a  given 
(Cl -  C1)/C1  and reduces the ratio of type l's to type 2's marginal utilities. 
For  example,  f=  .5,  0=1,  and  6  =  12  percent  imply  L=  .102  for 
0 -  r =  10 percent  and  .350 for r  -  r =  30  percent.  Another  way  to 
Table  5  THE  COSTS  OF EXCESSIVE  DEFICITS  IN THE  PRESENCE  OF 
LIQUIDITY  CONSTRAINTS  AND EXTERNALITIES  FROM  CAPITAL 
Baseline  Case:  =6%, H'=10,  r =  82=7%, 0=3,  81=25% 
Value  of L 
/ 
e-rP  .1  .25  .5  .75  .9 
0  -.031  -.073  -.127  -.157  -.163 
5%  -.008  -.029  -.076  -.113  -.117 
10%  .009  .006  -.031  -.070  -.069 
30%  .050  .094  .099  .084  (*) 
Effects  of Varying  the  Parameters  (f=.5, P?-r=30%,  and,  unless  otherwise  specified,  other 
parameters  as above) 
Varying 
Varying  H'  Varying  61  Varying  0  (=  2) 
H'  L  1  L  L  L 
10  .099  22.5 %  .114  1  .200  6%  .145 
15  .110  25.0 %  .099  2  .145  7%  .099 
20  .117  27.5 %  .089  3  .099  8%  .071 
Note: a is  set  equal  to f  in  all cases.  Cs  is  found  by  assuming  initial steady  state  capital-output  and 
bond-output  ratios of 2.5 and 0.4, respectively. 
(*) Condition  (3.17) violated. 90 *ROMER 
increase L is to reduce 82 (=r), so that the reduction in future consumption 
is  more  costly  to  type  2 agents.  For example,  f =  .5,  0 =  3,  r =  2 =  4 
percent,  and  81 =  16  percent  (implying  unadjusted  discount  rates  of 
S1 =  12 percent and 52 =  0 ifg  = 3 percent) imply L =  .088 for P0  -  r =  10 
percent and .394 for P?  -  f  = 30 percent. 
In  sum,  the  assumptions  that  deficits  have  large  direct  effects  on 
consumption  and that there are immense  externalities from capital forma- 
tion do not by themselves  lead to large welfare costs of excessive  deficits. 
A baseline case with large exteralities  yields L -  .1. Selective changes  of 
the parameter values can produce figures for L as high as .3 or .4. But other, 
perhaps more reasonable, changes (such as assuming smaller exteralities) 
can  reduce  the  welfare  costs  considerably  below  .1  or  even  make  the 
deficits beneficial.12 
4. Tax Smoothing 
4.1 FRAMEWORK 
Because  taxes  are not  lump  sum,  raising government  revenue  distorts 
behavior.  Under standard assumptions,  the cost of those  distortions per 
unit  of  revenue  raised  is  increasing  in  the  tax  rate.  As  a  result,  the 
distortions  associated  with  raising a given  present  value  of government 
revenue  are minimized  when  the  tax rate is  constant  over  time.  Thus, 
temporarily large deficits caused by a temporary tax cut cause unnecessar- 
ily large distortions in the financing of government  spending. 
To gauge how large this cost is likely to be, I use a simple representative 
agent infinite horizon model.  Assume  that there is a trend growth rate of 
the economy  of g, let all variables be measured relative to the size of the 
economy,  and assume  that the real interest rate r is fixed. As before, let r 
denote  r -  g. The path of taxes, T(t), must satisfy 
x 
e-tT(t)  =  G,  (4.1) 
t=O 
12. The calculations presented  in  this section  consider  policies  that leave  the  government 
debt  permanently  higher.  Some  experimentation  with  policies  of  form  T(t)= 
T7s -  [(r +  bl)Ae-tt  -  (f +  b2)e-2t]  (the sum of two policies of form (3.10) that together 
imply that B returns asymptotically to its initial level) suggests  that gradual repayment of 
the additional debt has little effect on L. This is the case even  in the  82 =  r =  4% case 
discussed in the text, where consumption in the relatively distant future is of considerable 
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where  G is the present discounted  value of future government  spending 
plus the value of government  liabilities outstanding  at time 0. 
Let 4(T)  denote the "cost" of raising tax revenue of amount T at a given 
time; specifically, let +(T) be the size of the lump  sum tax that would reduce 
utility by the same amount that utility is reduced by raising revenue T using 
the actual (distortionary) instruments employed by the government.  Thus, 
if taxes were  lump  sum,  (7T)  would  simply equal T. I assume  4(0)  =  0, 
?'(T)  J 1, and 4"(T) >  0-raising  revenue is distortionary, and the distor- 
tions increase as taxes rise.13 
The government's  objective should be to minimize 
e- rt(T(t))dt  (4.2) 
.  t=O 
subject to (4.1). The optimal policy is for T(t) to be constant and equal to fG. 
4.2 POLICY  CHANGES 
We can now  analyze the cost of excessive  deficits. Because there does not 
appear to be any widely  held view  that tax rates were below  their steady 
state  level  before  the  1981 tax cuts,  I focus  on  the  case  in  which  the 
economy  is initially in the optimal steady state. As before, I consider the 
experiment in which taxes are lowered by some amount AT for some length 
of time H, with taxes adjusted during this period to pay the interest on the 
additional debt; at time H taxes are raised to keep the stock of government 
debt constant thereafter. The policy being considered is thus 
TSS -  AT +  rtAT  0  t  t<  H 
T(t)  Tss  +  HAT  t>  H  (4.3) 
where  T"s  is the initial level of taxes. Since smooth  taxes are optimal, the 
policy after t =  H is the best possible one. 
13. In writing  the costs at t as a function  only of taxes  at t, I am, following  numerous  authors 
(see, for example, Barro,  1979, and Ballard,  Fullerton,  Shoven, and Whalley, 1985), 
neglecting  intertemporal  effects  and approximating  the costs of a path  of taxes  by the sum 
of the costs when each period  is treated  in a static  context.  The fact  that  individuals  could 
substitute  labor  supply intertemporally  around  the times of anticipated  changes  in taxes 
suggests that the actual  costs of time-varying  tax rates are somewhat  larger  than those 
computed  here;  the size of these additional  costs  would be increasing  in the intertemporal 
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The  effect  of  this  policy  on  the  utility  of  the  representative  agent, 
measured in time 0 dollars, is 
-H 
ASW =  -  e-rt [((Tss  -  AT +  rtAT) -  (Tss)]dt 
t=O 
.'  0 
e-  [(Tss  +  PHAT) -  4(TSS)]dt.  (4.4) 
t=H 
Thus  the  welfare  cost  of  the  tax  cut  is  L(AT)=  -ASW/C,  where  C is 
consumption  at time 0. 
A Taylor expansion  of L(AT)  shows  that 
1  ('(TSS)(AT)2  1  -  e-IH 
2  C  r 
1  "(y(Tss)(AT)2H 
2  2'v 
/  .  (4.5)  2  C 
Since the economy begins with the optimal policy, the cost (per unit of tax 
cut) of  a small temporary tax cut is  small.  The key  determinant  of  the 
magnitude  of (4.5), aside from the size of the tax cut, is  k". The following 
two illustrative calculations may be helpful in gauging plausible values of 
4". First, a typical estimate of the marginal cost of additional revenue in the 
United States, where the ratio of tax revenue to consumption  expenditures 
is  approximately  .4,  is  1.4  (Ballard, Shoven,  and  Whalley,  1985); thus 
4'(.4)  -  1.4 (C is normalized to 1). We also know  that ('(0)  =  1: the first 
unit of revenue can be raised without distortions. Thus the average  value of 
"(  ) over the  interval (0,.4) is 1. Second,  suppose  that preferences  are 
separable between  consumption  and leisure, that there is risk neutrality in 
consumption,  and that labor supply  has constant elasticity. Suppose  also 
that the labor supply  elasticity is chosen  so that 4'  is .4 when  the tax rate 
is .4 (roughly the average marginal rate for the United States in 1980); this 
implies  a  labor  supply  elasticity  of  .43.14 These  assumptions  imply 
(P("s)  -  1.96. If we take 1 to 2 to be a plausible range of values of 4"(T5), 
14. See Barro and Sahasakul (1983) and Ballard, Fullerton, Shoven,  and Whalley (1985) for 
marginal tax rates. A labor supply elasticity of .43 is unrealistically high. This arises from 
my desire to obtain a realistic figure for the marginal cost of revenue  using  a model  in 
which  all of the distorting effects of taxation operate through labor supply. Excessive  Deficits  ?  93 
the welfare costs of temporary excessive deficits of 6 percent of consump- 
tion  are  about  .007 -  .16  if  H =  5  and  .012 -  .026  if  H =  10  (these 
calculations assume  f =  .07; changes in r have little effect on the results). 
Thus,  the costs of excessive  deficits are dramatically smaller than their 
costs in the models of the previous two sections. At the same time the costs 
do not appear trivial. L =  .02, for example, means that the cost of the policy 
is 2 percent of a year's consumption-about  50 billion dollars. 
4.3 VARIATIONS  ON THE  BASIC  POLICY 
If taxes are not adjusted during the period of the tax cut to pay the interest 
on the additional government  debt, the path of taxes takes the form 
TSs -  AT  0 <  t<  H 
T(t)  +  (erH -  1)AT  t  -  H. 
Analysis parallel to that used  to derive (4.4)-(4.5) shows  that 
1  1  -  e--H 
L(AT) =M-  -  [(T-  AT) -  O(Tss)] 
C  f 
+  -  [(TSS  +  (erH -  1)AT) -  4(TSS)]  (4.7) 
r 
which  can be approximated by 
1  ("(Ts)(AT)2  eH  -  1 
L(AT)  (4.8)  (T)--  C  (4.8)  2  f 
(4.8) exceeds  (4.5) by a factor of erH.  For f and H large the costs of the two 
policies can be quite different. Suppose,  for example,  )"  =  2, r =  .07, and 
AT =  .06. Then L and L respectively  are approximately .015 and  .022 for 
H =  5,  .026 and  .052 for H =  10, .033 and  .096 for H =  15, and  .039 and 
.157 for H =  20. 
Finally, there is an asymmetry between  my  discussion  thus  far of the 
costs of excessive deficits through the distortionary effects of taxes and the 
discussion  above of their costs through their impact on saving: in Sections 
2  and  3  I put  considerable  emphasis  on  the  possibility  that  the  initial 
position  of the economy  was  not optimal, while  here I have ignored this 
possibility. As described above, there is a near consensus  that the stock of 
capital in  the  United  States has  generally been  inefficiently low,  but  no 94 *ROMER 
similar consensus  that tax rates prior to 1981 were not at the level needed 
to smooth taxes. Nonetheless,  for completeness  I consider here the costs of 
temporary tax reductions when  the path of taxes in the absence of the cut 
would  already not be smooth. 
Suppose  that taxes are initially not at their optimal level of fG, but are 
instead  fG -  ATo, ATo >  0.  Since  keeping  the  tax  rate  away  from  fG 
indefinitely would  cause the stock of government  debt relative to the size 
of the economy to diverge, for simplicity I assume that in the absence of the 
change in policy at t = 0 taxes would differ from their optimal level by ATo 
for some  length  of time Ho and  then be  changed  to their optimal level. 
Thus: 
To()  G -  ATo +  ftATO 
<H 
(4t9) 
TO  (t)  =  -  +  T  t  <  Ho.  (4.9) 
|rG  +  fHoATo  t >  Ho. 
The policy change being considered is: 
T(t)  To(t) -  AT +  tAT  0  t <  H 
(4.10) 
(To(t) +  fHAT  t -  H. 
Assuming  that H <  Ho, the cost of this change is: 
"H 
L(AT)  =  e-rt[(rfG  -  (ATo  +  AT) +  ft(ATo  +  AT)) 
,t=O 
-  4(rG  -  ATo +  ftATo)]dt 
'Ho 
+  e-rt[-(frG  +  fHAT  -  ATo +  ftATo)-  4(fG  -  ATo +  rtATo)]dt 
,t=H 
+  e-t[(frG  +  f(HoATo +  HAT)) -  (rG +  fHoATo)]dt  /C, 
-t=Ho  J/ 
(4.11) 
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1  4"(rG)  1  -  e-mH 
L(AT)  -  (AT)2 
2  r 
1 
-  e-H  2  +  2  eH  -  rH2(e-  -  e-  H))ATATo  .  (4.12) 
Comparison of (4.12) and (4.5) shows that an approximate upper bound for 
the welfare costs of excessive  deficits when  the initial level of taxes is not 
optimal is 1 +  2(ATo/AT)  times the welfare costs when  taxes are initially at 
their optimal level. For tax cuts of the magnitude that we are considering, 
ATo/AT  is  unlikely  to  be  very  large.  For example,  T0  T=  .03,  AT =  .06 
would  imply  that  taxes  (relative  to  consumption  expenditures)  were 
initially three percentage points below rG and were then cut an additional 
six percentage  points.  Yet even  in this case the welfare costs  of the  cut 
would be no more than double the costs for the case of an initially optimal 
policy. Thus, for plausible cases, the welfare costs arising from the failure 
to smooth  taxes are likely to be  somewhat,  but not dramatically, higher 
when  taxes  are  initially  already  too  low  than  when  they  are  initially 
optimal. 
5. Conclusion 
Many  economists  believe  that  the  U.S.  budget  deficits  of  recent  years 
represent large departures from optimal policy and that the welfare costs of 
these departures are very high. This paper provides quantitative estimates 
of a variety of possible welfare costs of excessive  deficits. It finds that for 
deficits of the size and duration experienced by the United  States in the 
1980's, the welfare costs through several possible channels-crowding  out 
caused by imperfect links between  generations, a combination of liquidity 
contraints and externalities from capital, and departures from tax smooth- 
ing-are  likely to be  of  moderate  size.  That is,  the  costs  through  these 
channels  on the one  hand certainly do not justify the dire warnings  that 
have been made about the social costs of deficits, and on the other hand are 
certainly not  negligible;  a  cost  equal  to  roughly  10 percent  of  a year's 
consumption  is typical. 
But  I also  find  that  deficits  may  have  extremely  large  welfare  costs 
through a channel that is not commonly emphasized.  When a conventional 
social welfare  function  is  used  in  a model  with  individuals  of  different 
generations, then if the social welfare function implies that the capital stock 
is  too  low  it  also  implies  that  redistributions  from  future  to  present 
generations  lower  social welfare  independently  of  whether  or not  they 96 *  ROMER 
affect capital accumulation. I find that for reasonable parameter values the 
social costs of temporarily high deficits through these  distributional chan- 
nels are likely to be extremely large-on  the order of a year's consumption. 
Moreover,  this  is  the  case  even  if the  arrival rate of new  agents  in  the 
economy  is extremely small. Thus, if one accepts the view  that the capital 
stock is too low (for reasons not having to do with factor payments differing 
from marginal products),  there is almost  certainly one  channel  through 
which  deficits have extremely large welfare costs. 
There are a large variety of ways  in which  deficits could have welfare 
costs, and this paper has made no attempt to be comprehensive.  I conclude 
by speculating briefly about other possible channels through which deficits 
might involve  large costs. Specifically, I mention five possibilities. 
The first two possibilities involve the model of Section 3, in which there 
are  externalities  from  capital.  First,  as  P.  Romer  emphasizes,  in  the 
presence of positive externalities from capital factors that affect saving can 
permanently  change the economy's  growth rate. If a period of temporary 
deficits  could  permanently  reduce  growth  (which  cannot  occur  in  the 
model of Section 3), it seems likely that the welfare costs of deficits could be 
dramatic. Second, it is crucial to the modest net costs of deficits obtained in 
Section 3 that deficits have a benefit as well as a cost. If deficits have a large 
effect on consumption  without there being a large benefit to this effect, the 
costs of deficits would be much larger. One possibility is that because of the 
difficulties of gathering and processing information about the future taxes 
implied by current deficits, individuals may increase their consumption  in 
response  to deficits, even  though they would  not do so if they were fully 
informed. 15 
A third possible reason that deficits could produce large welfare costs is 
that policy may be putting the economy on an explosive or unstable course. 
Throughout the paper I find, not surprisingly, that the costs of deficits can 
be much larger when  they cause the stock of debt to grow exponentially 
rather than  linearly.  Moreover,  an  exponential  path  that  is  allowed  to 
continue for too long may have even more dramatic consequences;  see for 
example Tobin (1986). 
Fourth, suppose  that deficits cause currency appreciation and thereby 
harm sectors of the economy that compete with foreign producers, and that 
for reasons  having  to  do  with  investment,  marketing,  or research and 
development  a temporary advantage to foreign producers causes them to 
obtain a permanently greater market share. Then a period of high deficits 
could lead to a permanent change in the composition  of output  (Baldwin 
15. This possibility  was suggested by Lawrence  Summers (who attributed  it to Kenneth 
Arrow). Excessive  Deficits  .  97 
and Krugman, 1986). It seems possible that the welfare costs through this 
channel could be large. 
Finally, deficits could have large welfare costs through channels that are 
not purely economic.  For example, it may be that large deficits and a high 
stock of government  debt generate extremely harmful uncertainty about 
the  course  of government  policy.16  Or large deficits and their economic 
effects could  create political pressure  for extremely undesirable  policies, 
such as broad protectionism. 
As the analysis of this paper suggests,  it is virtually impossible to gauge 
the likely magnitude  of the welfare effects of deficits through a particular 
channel  without  formal consideration  of  the  issues  involved.  Thus,  to 
obtain a clear picture of the welfare implications of large budget deficits, it 
is  essential  to  analyze  deficits'  welfare  implications  through  channels 
beyond  those considered in this paper. 
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higher than the one that prevailed before the tax cut. If this view is correct, 
it would be surprising indeed if the Reagan tax cut did not result in at least 
some social losses.  The important question is, then, how large are they? If 
they are small, policy makers need not be in a hurry to reduce the budget 
deficit and should be especially careful which tax rates are raised in order 
to reduce the budget  deficit. In contrast, if they are large, policy makers 
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In David Romer's view,  as well as mine,  the Reagan tax cut only tempo- 
rarily reduced tax rates, tax rates may eventually exceed their initial levels, 
and the ratio of government  debt to output will stabilize at a level much 
higher than the one that prevailed before the tax cut. If this view is correct, 
it would be surprising indeed if the Reagan tax cut did not result in at least 
some social losses.  The important question is, then, how large are they? If 
they are small, policy makers need not be in a hurry to reduce the budget 
deficit and should be especially careful which tax rates are raised in order 
to reduce the budget  deficit. In contrast, if they are large, policy makers EVANS  ?  99 
should eliminate the budget deficit quickly, even if highly distorting taxes 
are raised in the process. 
Romer estimates  the social losses  resulting from the Reagan tax cut in 
three  models.  One  of  the  models  is  absurd,  and  in  the  other  two  his 
estimates  are many  times  larger than  I regard as  reasonable.  Below  I 
provide more reasonable estimates. 
The first model that Romer analyzes is Well's modification of Blanchard's 
model.  Because I find Blanchard's model easier to interpret, I have carried 
out my analysis using it rather than Well's model. Whether one uses Weil's 
model or Blanchard's model does not make much difference quantitatively. 
In  Blanchard's  model,  the  following  two  equations  characterize the 
steady  state of a closed  competitive  economy  with  a linear homogenous 
Cobb-Douglas technology in capital and labor measured in efficiency units: 
[(1  -  y)(l  -  r) -  p(O -  1)(1  -  7)d*]r*2 
-  [(6  +  og)(1  -  y)  +  ag(l  -  r) +  p(o  -  1)(1  -  r)a  +  p(6  +  Op)d*)]r* 
+  [(8 + Og)ag -  (  +  Op)ap]  =  0  (1) 
and 
* =  (1  -  y)[ca(K  r*)](1l-a)  -  ag[a&(K  r*)]1/(-a),  (2) 
where  r* is the steady-state marginal product of capital, c* is steady-state 
consumption  per  efficiency  unit  of  labor, d* is  the  steady-state  ratio of 
government  debt  to output,  y is the fraction of output  absorbed by  the 
government,  r  is  the  marginal  tax  rate  on  property  income,  8 is  the 
subjective  discount  rate,  p  is  an  index  of  how  disconnected  current 
members of families feel from future members, 1 -  0 is the elasticity of the 
instantaneous  utility function with respect to consumption,  K is the initial 
capital stock per worker, g is the growth rate of the effective labor force, and 
a is the  share of capital in output.  I have  used  equations  (1) and  (2) to 
calculate how  the Reagan tax cut might be expected  to affect the steady- 
state marginal product of capital and the steady-state path for consumption 
in Blanchard's model.  I have assumed  that the U.S.  economy  is closed;1 
1. This assumption  is made primarily for convenience.  It turns out, however,  that the total 
reduction in consumption  is roughly the same whether the U.S. or the world is assumed to 
be the closed economy  described by equations (1) and (2). The reason is that the percentage 
fall in consumption in Table 1 below is roughly linear in d*. Therefore, if the world economy 
is q times larger than the U.S. economy,  d* rises by l/q times as much, the percentage fall 
in  steady-state  consumption  is  1/q times  as much,  and aggregate  consumption  rises by 
roughly q x  (1/q) times as much. 100  COMMENT 
Table  1  DESCRIPTIVE  STATISTICS  FOR  STEADY  STATES  OF BLANCHARD'S 
MODEL 
Percentage  Fall in 
Marginal  Product  of Capital  Consumption 
p  0  8  d*=0.6  d*=0.8  d*=1.0  d*=0.6  d*=0.8  d*=1.0 
.00  1  .0400  .1000  .1000  .1000  0.00  0.00  0.00 
.00  2  .0100  .1000  .1000  .1000  0.00  0.00  0.00 
.01  1  .0381  .1004  .1006  .1008  0.10  0.15  0.20 
.01  2  .0063  .1007  .1011  .1015  0.19  0.30  0.40 
.02  1  .0357  .1008  .1013  .1017  0.21  0.32  0.43 
.02  2  .0014  .1017  .1026  .1035  0.43  0.66  0.89 
that it was in a steady state when  the Reagan tax cut passed; that federal, 
state, and local governments  always absorb 22.5 percent of output;2 that 
the  initial ratio of  capital to  output  is  2.5  years; that  a  =  .25; that  the 
effective labor force grows 3 percent a year;3  that property income is taxed 
at a 30 percent marginal rate; and that the initial ratio of government  debt 
to output is .217 years.4 Consequently,  the marginal product of capital is 
initially 10 percent a year. Table 1 reports the new steady-state value of the 
marginal  product  of  capital and  the  percentage  amount  by  which  the 
Reagan tax cut reduced  the  steady-state  path of consumption  for given 
values  of p, 0, and d*.5 
Because p is found  to be negative  or insignificantly positive  when  it is 
estimated,  using  U.S.  or Israeli data [Evans (1988); Leiderman and Razin 
(1988)], zero is the most defensible choice for p. For the sake of argument, 
however,  I also consider p =  .01 and .02. I would  like to follow Romer in 
choosing  0  =  3,  but  this  value  is  inconsistent  with  8  >  0.  I therefore 
consider  0 =  1 and 2. The ratio of government  debt to output is assumed 
to stabilize at .6, .8, or 1.0 years. Prompt tax increases could stabilize it at .6; 
1.0 corresponds to substantial delay in raising taxes; and 0.8 is an interme- 
diate case. 
2. This figure is the average ratio of government  purchases to net national product for 1981- 
1986. 
3. I have  followed  Romer in choosing  K =  2.5 even  though  I think that a larger K is more 
appropriate. My conclusions below would have been strengthened,  had I chosen  K >  2.5. 
The values for a and g are also those chosen  by Romer. 
4. This figure is the ratio of the market value of the privately held federal debt [Cox (1985)] to 
net national income at the end of 1981III.  I have measured the government debt in this way 
primarily for convenience.  The other choices available are hardly more defensible. 
5. The subjective discount  rate is set so that the other parameters in the model  assume  the 
values above and the economy  is initially in a steady state. I consider only values of p and 
0 for which  8 can be positive. EVANS 101 
Table 1 reveals  that unless  p and  0 are as large as possible  and  d* is 
allowed  to  rise beyond  1,  the  Reagan tax cut will  not  much  affect the 
steady-state marginal product of capital6  and the steady-state consumption 
path. In other words,  the behavior of the Blanchardian economies  in Table 
1 is virtually indistinguishable  from the behavior of a Ricardian economy; 
hence  Ricardian equivalence may be a good empirical benchmark. 
If Blanchard's model is valid, the Reagan tax cut has produced and will 
produce only small changes in aggregate consumption.  Romer nonetheless 
concludes that the tax cut resulted in enormous social losses.  How can this 
be? The answer  is that he has chosen  to use  a social welfare function in 
which future members of families are weighted heavily enough and current 
members of families are weighted  lightly enough  that these small changes 
in  consumption  produce  enormous  social  losses.  His  choice  of  social 
welfare function, however,  is not the only defensible one. 
In Blanchard's model, each family maximizes an objective function of the 
form 
1e-(  +p)t[c(t)]1-  dt,  (3) 
where c(t) is the family's consumption  in period t. Now,  suppose  that the 
world  (or if one  wants  to be chauvinistic, the U.S.)  ought  to be one big, 
happy  family in which  current members  do  not feel  disconnected  from 
future  members.  Suppose  further  that  the  preferences  of  this  family 
between  present and future consumption  ought to count. A social welfare 
function that embodies  these ideals is obtained by equating p to zero and 
replacing c(t) with aggregate consumption  C(t): 
(  ) i:e- &[C(t)]1-  dt.  (4) 
Using Blanchard's model,  I have dynamically simulated the Reagan tax 
cut and then used the social welfare function (4) to calculate how the tax cut 
affected social welfare.  I find that in the worst case (p =  .02,  0 =  2, and 
6. Table 1 suggests  that the Reagan tax cut did not appreciably affect either short-term or 
long-term interest rates. (This conclusion would be especially true if U.S. securities markets 
were well integrated into world securities markets since the effect would  then be 1/q times 
that reported in the table, where q is the ratio of the U.S. capital stock to the world capital 
stock.) Table 1 therefore provides  an explanation for why  positive  correlations between 
budget  deficits and interest rates are hard to find; see,  for example,  Evans (1985, 1987a, 
1987b, 1987c, 1987d). 102 *  COMMENT 
Table  2  DESCRIPTIVE  STATISTICS  FOR  STEADY  STATES  OF BLANCHARD'S 
MODEL  WITH  A REDUCTION  OF THE  MARGINAL  TAX  RATE  ON 
PROPERTY  INCOME  TO .25 
Marginal  Product  of Capital  Percentage  Fall  in Consumption 
p  0  8  d*= 0.6  d*= 0.8  d*= 1.0  d*= 0.6  d*= 0.8  d*= 1.0 
.00  1  .0400  .0933  .0933  .0933  -1.81  -1.81  -1.81 
.00  2  .0100  .0933  .0933  .0933  -1.81  -1.81  -1.81 
.01  1  .0381  .0939  .0940  .0942  -1.66  -1.61  -1.56 
.01  2  .0063  .0944  .0948  .0951  -1.51  -1.41  -1.31 
.02  1  .0357  .0945  .0949  .0953  -1.48  -1.37  -1.26 
.02  2  .0014  .0957  .0966  .0974  -1.15  -0.92  -0.69 
d* =  1.0) the  Reagan  tax cut will  impose  a  social loss  equivalent  to  a 
permanent 0.13 percent reduction in consumption beginning in 1981IV. In 
1987 the reduction in consumption  amounted  only to $4 billion. 
Even this small figure overestimates the actual social loss if the Reagan 
tax  cut  permanently  shifted  taxes  from  capital  to  labor.7 Specifically, 
suppose  that the marginal tax rate on property income  fell permanently 
from 30 percent to 25 percent.8 Table 2 reports for several values of p, 0, and 
d* the steady-state marginal product of capital and the percentage reduc- 
tion  in  steady-state  consumption  resulting  from  the  Reagan  tax  cut. 
Apparently, the effects of the reduced r swamp the effects of the increased 
government  debt; that is, the steady-state marginal product of capital falls 
and steady-state consumption rises. Clearly, then, the Reagan tax cut could 
have made everyone better off, and raising r in order to reduce the budget 
deficit could easily make everyone  worse off. 
In  the  second  model  that  Romer  analyzes,  capital is  not  subject  to 
diminishing returns, no stable steady state exists, and the economy  suffers 
an infinite social loss because it had the bad luck not to inherit an infinite 
capital stock. I doubt that one can learn anything useful from analyzing this 
model. 
The third model that Romer analyzes is a tax-smoothing model. Here he 
derives some  useful formulae, but unfortunately he plugs much too large 
a value for (p"  into these formulae in calculating the social losses  resulting 
from the Reagan tax cut. 
7. According to David Stockman, the Reagan tax cut was  a "Trojan horse" whose  purpose 
was  to shift taxes permanently  from capital to labor by first promising  everyone  perma- 
nently lower taxes and then eventually raising the taxes on wage income. 
8. I am looking at the Reagan tax cut here from the perspective of 1981IV before TEFRA  and 
tax reform largely eliminated the initial reduction in r. EVANS  103 
It is straightforward to calculate  p"  if one is willing to approximate the 
social loss from wage  taxation as the area between  the labor demand  and 
supply  curves.  If  competition  prevails,  if  output  is  produced  with  a 
Cobb-Douglas  technology,  and  if  the  compensated  elasticity  of  labor 
supply is the constant parameter E,  then the social loss resulting from wage 
taxation at the marginal rate ,u is 
[1  +  (  [(1 -  a)(1 
-  )~  +) 
-  [(1  -  a)(1  -  )]1-)/(1+a),  (5) 
where  1 -  a is the share of labor in output. This social loss is measured 
relative to the wage bill that would  prevail, were ,u zero. Calculating <d'  is 
then  simply  a matter of  differentiating (5) twice  with  respect  to  ,L and 
evaluating  the resulting expression  at appropriate values  of a,  ,,  and  E. 
Following Romer, I assume that a =  .25 and uL  =  .4. According to Ballard, 
Shoven,  and  Walley  (1985), a reasonable  estimate  of  the  compensated 
elasticity of aggregate labor supply is .15. Therefore, <p"  = .47, and the social 
loss resulting from the Reagan tax cut is equivalent to a one-time loss of $10 
to $20 billion. For  'p"  to be in the range 1 to 4 that Romer chooses  would 
require that e be appreciably larger than .4. Virtually the only  economist 
who  thinks the aggregate labor supply is that elastic is Art Laffer! 
I conclude  that David Romer has not made a convincing  case that the 
Reagan tax cut produced large social losses. 
I thank  Steve Cecchetti  for helpful  comments. 
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Comment 
JAMES TOBIN 
Yale  University 
Reagan fiscal policies raised the ratio of federal debt to GNP by about 15 
percentage  points in five years, reversing a downward  trend in the ratio 
ever since 1946. The deficits of the 1980s, 4 percent to 5 percent of GNP, 
even in fair economic weather, were a new departure. So were the high real 
interest rates that accompanied them, even after victory over inflation had 
been  declared. The "real world" we  economists  purport to study  seldom 
performs for us so dramatic an experiment. Analysis and measurement  of 
its effects present an opportunity and a challenge to macroeconomics. The 
profession's  response  has been divided and uncertain. 
David Romer's paper was invited, I guess,  in order to bring some order 
and  precision  into  the  debate by  examining  and  estimating  the  various 
alleged  costs  of a period of deficit spending.  Romer does  not assess  the 
effects  econometrically,  although  his  work  might  be  a prelude  to  such 
attempts.  Instead,  Romer deploys  state-of-the-art theory and tries to pin 
down  quantitative orders of magnitude by plausible simulations. 
Romer has executed his commission very well-at  least he will have after 
another iteration. Good papers generally contain some surprises. Here the 
surprise is the high estimate of welfare costs attributable  to deficits' transfer 
of wealth  from future citizens to the present generation.  These  costs are 
high,  in particular, relative to the modest costs of "crowding-out." Romer 
does  find crowding-out  to be substantial when  households  are liquidity- 
constrained, but the welfare costs are roughly offset by the welfare gains 
from  relaxation of  those  constraints.  With liquidity  constraints  there  is 
over-saving; some  workers are not able to consume  now  as much of the 
wealth represented by their future wages  as they would  like. 
Good  papers  also  stimulate further work,  and Romer's will  surely do 
that. The art of economics  is rarely in a state where it is fully ready to be 
applied to important practical problems. Our tools are invented and honed 
by being used.  That is the opportunity afforded by Reagan fiscal policy. 
1. Crowding  Out 
Those  economists  who,  like myself,  deplored  the drastic departure from 
pre-Reagan policies,  did so for two reasons. 
First, we  saw  that the new  policy mix was  putting the budget  and the 
economy  on  an  unstable  track, along  which  the  debt/GNP  ratio would Comment  105 
grow explosively. This was a warning, not a prediction. The prediction was 
that policies which were so clearly recipes for instability would be changed 
sooner  or later. This has  happened.  Congress  cut short the  President's 
defense  buildup,  restored bits and pieces of tax revenue,  agreed with the 
President on a compromise  program to keep  social security solvent,  and 
twice  enacted  Gramm-Rudman targets for deficit reduction.  Thus David 
Romer notes that his study of the costs of the Reagan fiscal experiment is 
not a story of catastrophic reckoning, but a more mundane  calculation of 
the costs of temporary and finite fiscal and social profligacy. 
There is a technical analytical difficulty here. An unstable rise in the debt/ 
GNP ratio results when  the outstanding  debt is positive,  the real interest 
rate on it exceeds  or equals the economy's  growth rate, and the primary 
budget  (i.e.  excluding  debt  service) is  in  deficit.  According  to  Phelps's 
golden  rule criterion of efficiency, the net marginal productivity of capital 
should not be less than the growth rate. This condition seems to guarantee 
that  any  deficit  spending  policy  will  be  unstable.  A  resolution  of  the 
problem is that the interest rate relevant to the Treasury can be smaller than 
the  growth  rate, even  if the marginal productivity of capital is not.  The 
Treasury taxes  debt interest along  with  other income,  whereas  it is  the 
pre-tax return to capital that is relevant to the Phelps condition. Public debt 
is less risky and bears a lower interest rate than privately owned  capital. 
Part of  the  public  debt  is  monetized,  so  that  the  public  benefits  from 
seignorage.  Romer dodges  explosive  scenarios by assuming  that taxes are 
adjusted to pay interest as debt rises. 
Second, we economists  objected to the fiscal policies of the 1980s on the 
old-fashioned  classical and  Keynesian  grounds  of  "crowding-out."  We 
assumed  that Barro-Ricardo  neutrality does  not hold.  Anyway,  it doesn't 
make sense to tell politicians and voters they need do nothing about deficits 
because  taxpayers will behave  on the expectation that they will do some- 
thing some day. We assumed that a new and higher debt/GNP ratio would 
be maintained and not rolled back, and that the aggregate demand impacts 
of fiscal policies  would  be wholly  offset by monetary policies  or market 
prices. The crowding-out cost calculation would concern the effects of a cut 
of 0.15 in the capital/GNP ratio, equal to the rise in the debt/GNP ratio. 
The  comparative  statics of  steady  states are not  very  exciting.  I used 
essentially  the same assumptions  as Romer. In Section 2.3 he makes Net 
National  Product  a  Cobb-Douglas  function  of  capital  and  labor,  with 
elasticities of 0.25 and 0.75. (Readers should be careful not to confuse this 
Romer model of production with the linear CRS model he uses elsewhere. 
That model,  which  assumes  that labor and capital are perfect substitutes, 
surely distorts and biases the results for the significant finite variations in 
which we are interested.) I prefer to take the production function to apply 106 *  TOBIN 
to Gross National Product and to subtract capital depredation explicitly. To 
make this change and at the same time retain Romer's calibration of the net 
marginal product of capital at 0.10, I have to make the elasticities of output 
0.33 for capital and 0.67 for labor. 
Romer assumes  an initial capital/NNP ratio of 2.5. Assuming  a depreci- 
ation rate of 0.05, the corresponding capital/GNP ratio is 2.22. It is this that 
I assume Reagan lowered to 2.07. The public's desired wealth/GNP ratio is 
thus assumed  not to respond either to the interest rate, which rises by 100 
basis points,  or to the prospect of higher future taxes. In a steady state K, 
GNP,  NNP,  and  other real aggregates  grow  at 3.0  percent per year,  of 
which  2.0  is  labor-augmenting  progress  and  1.0  is  labor force growth. 
These  are Romer's numbers.  Along  the reference track, the gross invest- 
ment required is 17.8 percent of GNP; along the new path it is 16.6 percent. 
The rest is available for "consumption,"  private and public. (By the way, 
Romer ignores the existence of government purchases "G", which amount 
to 21 percent of GNP, and so will I. I do note that even if this is all assumed 
to be consumption,  it takes the form of public goods  equally available to 
citizens  of all co-existing generations.)  Per capita consumption  along the 
"post-Reagan" steady-state path is 98 percent of that of the reference track. 
The welfare loss is even  smaller, of course, because the transition is slow 
and initially provides increases in consumption. 
Losing 2 percent of consumption is like setting the growth calendar back 
one or two years. William Fellner used the same metric to minimize the cost 
of raising the unemployment  target by a point.  Surely, he  told me,  it is 
worth it to lower the risk of being on the wrong side of the inflation-safe 
threshold. The politics of government spending and taxing waxes passion- 
ate about even smaller amounts. Temporary and finite profligacies are not 
going to look big sub specie  aeternitatis. 
However,  the concerns we economists voice about "crowding out" seem 
disproportionate  to  the  Cobb-Douglas  growth-theoretic  calculations  of 
Romer and myself, which are of course nothing new.  Probably we suspect 
those  calculations understate the effects. As a veteran of past heydays  of 
growth and capital theory, I suggest some reasons. Cobb-Douglas probably 
overstates the possibilities of substituting labor for capital. More important, 
models  in which  technical progress is embodied  in successive  vintages  of 
investment  goods  would  attribute greater importance to investment,  even 
replacement investment.  The age of capital in use may be a better index of 
capital intensity than the ratios of undepreciated stock to labor or output. 
Learning by doing  can be the source of an externality that magnifies  the 
contribution  of  investment  to  productivity  growth.  Perhaps  we  should 
allow capital-augmenting as well as labor-augmenting progress (in produc- 
tion specifications,  not Cobb-Douglas,  where  the distinction is meaning- Comment  107 
ful).  This  would  sacrifice  steady  state  equilibrium,  while  making  the 
growth rate itself endogenous.  Finally, we are probably being too narrow 
in our conception  of "K." We know better, but we  tailor our calculations 
and simulations to identify capital with durable business  plant and equip- 
ment, homogeneous  over time and space. Yet there are also public capital 
and human capital, in both of which vintage effects and embodied progress 
could be important. 
2.  Liquidity  Constraints 
In the model of Romer's Section 3, deficits crowd out investment  because 
tax reductions  enable  current liquidity-constrained  consumers  to  spend 
more. The government,  in effect, borrows on their behalf from the affluent 
future.  In welfare  calculus,  the  gains  of relaxing constraints  that reflect 
imperfection or incompleteness  of capital markets compensate  for most of 
the costs of crowding-out.  The relevance of this model to the events  and 
policies that triggered the paper is pretty thin. The deficits of the 1980s did 
not come from tax cuts and transfers designed  to help the segments  of the 
population  most likely to be liquidity-constrained. Generalized fiscal defi- 
cits do not look like good remedies for liquidity constraints. However,  there 
may well be a case for expanding  the role of the federal government  as a 
financial intermediary, especially for young people investing in education. 
3.  Tax-Smoothing 
Romer finds no big deal in conventional crowding-out.  He discusses  two 
other sources of costs of deficits. One comes last in his paper, in Section 4: 
Like Robert Barro, Romer detects social costs in changing taxes from year to 
year, even when  the changes are correctly foreseen. Tax-smoothing mini- 
mizes  the  sum  of  discounted  future  deadweight  losses,  subject to  the 
constraint that the discounted  sum of tax collections meet the prescribed 
need for revenue.  The loss at each time is taken to be simply an increasing 
function of contemporaneous  revenue,  with an increasing first derivative. 
But we  know  very little about the underlying  technology  of deadweight 
losses.  Surely there are complicated interactions between  periods. Can we 
even  be  sure that marginal costs  in any one  period are increasing? Is it 
obvious that ten years of 25 percent tax rates are less distortionary than five 
years of 50 percent rates and five of zero rates? In any case, Romer does not 
estimate  significant  costs  from  the  temporary  tax  cuts  he  simulates. 
Moreover, we don't know whether the 1981 tax cuts are anti-smoothing or 
pro-smoothing; maybe Reagan will have won  his battle against the public 
sector and his new  lower taxes will be permanent. 108 *  TOBIN 
4. Intergenerational  Redistribution 
Romer's most striking finding-surprising  at first glance, but intuitive once 
you understand it-is  the substantial welfare cost of perverse redistribution 
from the unborn to the living. That is the wrong direction if the interest rate 
is  above  its  optimum,  according  to  the  modified  golden  rule.  In  that 
situation  future generations  are already being  shortchanged:  the  capital 
stock is too small. Tax cuts enabling living taxpayers to add further to their 
lifetime consumption  at the expense of future taxpayers just compound  the 
felony.  This is true even  if the deficits are not charged with  any further 
crowding-out.  Indeed,  the  redistribution costs  are first order, while  the 
crowding-out  effects are second order and, as already noted,  small. 
How  do we  know  the U.S.  was  under-capitalized in 1980? Romer just 
cites the widespread  opinion,  within and beyond  the profession,  that the 
country chronically saves too little. His calculations assume that the optimal 
real interest rate is 6 percent, the product of an elasticity of marginal utility 
(his 0) equal to 3, and labor-augmenting progress g of 2 percent per year. (It 
would  be 7 percent, including  1 point for population growth,  if the social 
welfare judge valued the per capita consumption utility of each generation 
unweighted  by the size of the generation. But if 0 were less than or equal 
to  1,  the  optimal  interest  rate  would  be  below  the  Phelps  efficiency 
threshold,  n  +  g  =  0.03,  making  public  debt  rather than  capital  the 
preferred vehicle  of intergenerational transfers.) Romer assumes  that the 
net  marginal productivity of capital is  10 percent.  Following  a long  and 
noble tradition in welfare economics,  intergenerational neutrality, Romer 
takes  the  social  time  preference  discount  rate /3 to  be  zero.  But S, the 
personal time preference rate of consumers of all generations,  is not zero. 
In his baseline case it is 3.3 percent; it has to be in order to generate saving 
consistent  with  the chosen  parameters and with realistic initial values  of 
capital/output and debt/output ratios. The difference between  the within- 
generation discount 8 and the across-generation discount  3 is the source of 
the under-capitalization. 
While I agree qualitatively with the result, I do not think the Blanchard- 
Weil model Romer used for quantitative simulation was a happy choice. In 
the model,  everyone lives forever, but discounts the future as if he did not 
expect to (or she?-as  far as I can see there is just one sex, thus no sex, in 
this world.)  Some  start their infinite lives later than others.  But, looking 
forward from  today,  we  were  all just born  (that is,  just  newly  arrived 
adults),  except  that  oldtimers  are  starting with  some  accumulations  of 
savings.  (It seems hard to specify a convergent social welfare integral over 
generations  from minus  infinity to plus  infinity.  See equations  2.20 and Discussion  *  109 
2.20', which are bound to diverge in one direction or the other, depending 
on the sign of  3 -  n.) 
With this demography and biology, it is hard for me to see why a rational 
person's  8 should be nonzero.  If I nevertheless  swallow the positive  6, it is 
hard to see  why  I should  make  3 differ from it. If people  lived  forever, 
would  they  need  government  to protect the society's future? If students 
and faculties lived on campus forever, would  we  need  trustees to assure 
the immortality of the university? 
Note that in this model positive saving occurs only if r exceeds  8. If that 
condition is met, no one will ever want to dissave; and no one will ever be 
liquidity-constrained. With no life cycle or retirement saving, and with no 
age  preferences,  there is nothing  to  give  rise to variations over  time  in 
individual saving rates. Nor are there generational vintage effects on labor 
quality and productivity, such as those so evident in conferences like this. 
In the literature that Romer's paper is bound to provoke, I hope life cycle 
models  more faithful to human biology and demography  will replace the 
Blanchard-Weil-Romer model.  Life cycle models  do  not need  to assume 
away all intergenerational bonds.  And liquidity-constraints can arise natu- 
rally in them  from realistic age-earnings  profiles and  do  not  have  to be 
introduced as dei ex machinae. 
I allow myself  a concluding  obiter  dictum. When  I was  a boy,  interper- 
sonal cardinal utility comparisons were considered  a "no-no." Now  they 
are  unapologetically  and  routinely  used  to  evaluate  intergenerational 
equity  and  social welfare,  usually  in  models  where  each  generation  is 
represented by a single typical agent. The same comparisons can of course 
be used to evaluate other inequalities and redistributions, given that agents 
have  widely  different endowments.  Maybe within-generation  inequities 
and welfare losses  are greater than those between  generations.  For exam- 
ple,  Abba Lerner was bold enough  to ignore the above taboo and to use 
declining  marginal  utility  as  a  justification  for  progressive  taxes  and 
transfers.  Maybe  the  future  is  being  shortchanged,  but  we  should  be 
cautious  in seeking  remedies  that would  increase contemporaneous  ine- 
qualities of income and wealth in order to increase saving and investment 
for the benefit of future consumers,  most of whom  will be better off than 
most Americans today. 
Discussion 
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ignore the benefits from learning by doing and running a deficit during a 
recession.  Paul  Evans  and  Larry Kotlikoff argued  that  the  method  of 
taxation by which a given deficit is reduced can be quite important. While 
Paul Romer asserted  that the key  question  is whether  deficits-through 
their impact on savings-affect  growth rates. If growth rates are adversely 
affected then costs of deficits could be quite high. Larry Summers worried 
that open  economy  implications,  particularly the possible  instabilities for 
certain sectors of the economy,  were overlooked. 
With respect to the models  in the paper, particularly that of section 2, 
David Romer agreed that the choice of social welfare function was critical 
but  felt  that  using  one  that  did  not  separately  weigh  the  utility  of 
generations  would  be  misleading.  For instance,  maximizing  aggregate 
consumption  may lead to inefficient equilibria. He also reiterated that the 
labor supply elasticity assumed in the tax smoothing model was required to 
fit the stylized facts. Andrew Abel pointed out that the costs of the deficit 
depend  on the spread between r and r*  and empirically its not clear how to 
measure r, different proxies can lead to different conclusions.  The result in 
the paper is achieved by means of a high r, but this could also be achieved 
by a low P. Maurice Obstfeld added that the use of a constant interest rate 
assumption  is not innocuous. 
Finally Robert Hall argued that the assumption  that taxes will definitely 
be increased is dubious. He argued instead that government spending was 
likely to be adjusted and that deficit may stabilize without a further increase 
in taxes. James Tobin noted that cutbacks in government spending may not 
be desirable and that justifying the deficit now as being needed  to fight the 
1982 recession  is inappropriate,  since monetary  policy  might  have  been 
used  instead. 